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Ex Post Facto in the Civil Context:

Unbridled Punishment
BY JANE HARRIS AnTEN*
INTRODUCTION

Over the past ten years, the federal government has made increasing
use of the civil law as a device for punishing wrongdoers. The recent
controversy in the United States Congress over the funding of the

National Endowment for the Arts, and in particular the Endowment's
support of Robert Mapplethorpe's work, gave America a glimpse of the

power of Congress to retroactively punish organizations and individuals.'
Since this funding controversy arose in the civil context, the restrictions
on funding were viewed by many as constitutionally inoffensive.
However, cries were made that such acts infringed upon the Ex Post

Facto Clause or were unconstitutional bills of attainder Similar cries are
often heard when the government seizes assets under the authority of laws

that allow seizure of property suspected to have been purchased with the
proceeds of an illegal endeavor? Those civil forfeiture statutes allow
property seizure from citizens even without conviction. These actions are
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina College of Law. B.A. 1977, Hollins College;
J.D. 1983, New York University; LL.M. 1985, Georgetown University. The author wishes to thank
David Kaye for his exhaustive and invaluable critique of the draft manuscript, Robert Bartels and
Hannah Arterian for their suggestions about content and organization, David Kader for cheering me
on and Linda Bowen for the many hours of production support. I also wish to thank Robert Todd
and Peter Tepley for their research assistane.
'See Judith Bresler, Ar4 Obscenity and the First Amendment, 14 NOVA L.REV. 357, 364-67
(1989-90).
' See Arthur I.Jacobs, "One ifby Land, Two ifby Se," 14 NovA L. REv. 343, 349 (1989-90).
Jacobs notes that the United States Senate attempted to punish two art organizations through a bill
of attainder for involvement with the Mapplethorpe exhibit. Id. The Senate amendment provided that
funds were not to be allocated to the National Endowment for the Arts if such funds were to be "used
for a direct grant to the Southern Center for Contemporary Art (SECCA) in Winston-Salem, North
Carolina or for the Institute of Contemporary Art at the University of Pennsylvania." 135 CONG. Rc.
S8762, S8774 (daily ed. July 26, 1989) (amendment of Sen. Helms).
'This action was authorized by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 1970, § 511(aX6), 21 U.S.C. § 881(aX6) (1988), which provides for the forfeiture to the United
States government of
[a]1l moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or
intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation
of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchangei and all moneys, negotiable
instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this
subchapter.

Id.
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civil in nature and require no criminal proceedings. As a result they have
been repeatedly challenged on constitutional grounds.
One of the constitutional theories often used in these challenges is
drawn from the Ex Post Facto Clause. However, courts consistently find
that since the statute in question is civil in nature, the Ex Post Facto

Clause is
unjustified
a criminal
legislative

not applicable The standard retort to the laments of
punishment is that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only in
context and therefore places no restriction on these civil
acts.' Indeed, as interpreted by modem courts, such an

observation may seem to be true. However, the sense of uneasiness and

unfairness that many Americans felt as Congress attempted to
retroactively restrict arts funding or that frustrated citizens feel as their
property is seized, finds recognition among the drafters of the United
States Constitution.
The drafters firmly believed that the power to create ex post facto

laws was one of the hallmarks of tyranny." Such laws place the citizens
at the mercy of the government, unable to know the consequences of their
acts and constantly subject to the possibility of legislative vindictiveness.
The framers incorporated the ex post facto bar into the Constitution in
two places, thus prohibiting both federal and state legislatures from
passing retroactively applicable legislation.7 The Constitution makes no
distinction between laws on the basis of whether they are civil or criminal
in form. There is a strong argument to be made that the framers debated
the issue and determined that all retroactive laws were suspect and that

only upon a showing of necessity should a civil law be allowed to have
retrospective effect.8
4

At least one court has found, however, that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred civil forfeiture.
United States v. Lot No. 50, 557 F. Supp. 72 (D. Nev. 1982). This case, however, was specifically
overruled by United States v. $5,644,540.00 inUS. Currency, 799 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1986).
1 A key decision holding that forfeiture under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970 is a civil penalty and therefore not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause is United
States v. D.KG. Appaloosas, Inc, 829 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 976 (1988).
In DX G., the court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause was not violated by the government's seizure
of nine gold bars under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 even
though the gold bars were purchased prior to the law's enactment. Id. at 544-45. The court noted that
"it is beyond dispute that the ex postfacto clause applies only to criminal cases."Id. at 540.
'James Iredell noted that an Ex Post Facto Clause prevented the exercise of "tyranny that...
would be intolerable ....James kedell, Observaioms on George Mason's Objections to the Federal
Constitution, inPA.wwss ON THE CoNsrrrmroN oF THE UNrrED STATEs 368, 369 (Paul L.Ford
ed. 1888).
7See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.");U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, ci. 1 ("No State shall.. .pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post fac.to
Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ....). These provisions, though actually
comprising two separate clauses, will be referred to as the Ex Post Facto Clause.
' James Madison appears to have based some of his comments concerning the ability of courts
to prevent laws affecting an existing contract upon a belief that such actions were prohibited by the
Ex Post Facto Clause. MADISON's DEBATES 479 (Gaillard Hunt et al.
eds., 1920). Gaillard Hunt, one

Ex POST FACTO
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Despite the impassioned voices that echo in the legislative history,
the courts have diluted the force of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In the
criminal arena, the Clause is interpreted with maximum protection for
the disadvantaged offender, but when the ex post facto law takes civil
form, there is a strong presumption of legitimacy. Before an ex post
facto violation is found in the civil context, the law's opponent must
show that the civil law is unmistakably punitive.' In many cases,
such a law may be deemed necessary in order to effect expansive
regulatory schemes. However, the values that underlie the Ex Post
Facto Clause demand that there be some protection against civil laws
that are punitive in nature.
While the drafters anticipated that the proponent of a retroactively
effective law would be required to show the necessity for such
retroactivity, modem courts have seemingly shifted this burden,
requiring instead that the law's challenger show by unmistakable
evidence that the law is punitive before recognizing the existence of
an ex post facto violation."° Obviously, the mere recitation of a
legitimate governmental purpose should not be sufficient to save a
statute from ex post facto review. However, when dealing with such
mixed-motive statutes, the dilution of the values underlying the Ex
Post Facto Clause can be seen to have essentially cleared the path for
such deference to the government."
The protection against ex post facto laws was of the highest importance
to the drafters of the Constitution and these values are offended whether
of the editors of

MADSON'S DEBATEs,

argues that Madison thought the terms ex post facto and

retrospective had the same meaning. This serves to illustrate that in Madison's view the Ex Post Facto
Clause should apply to civil statutes as well as criminal. 2 MAx FARRAND, REcoRDS Op THE
FEmtAL CoNvlbMoN oF 1787 440 (2d ed. 1937). Other commentators have noted that "[i]t is
improbable that Madison alone understood the terms [of the Ex Post Facto Clause] to have the
meaning he attaches to them." Oliver P. Field, Ex Post Facto inthe Cc'ztitudon, 20 MIcH. L. RLrv.
315, 320 (1920-21).
'See, eg., United States v. P.K.G. Appaloosa's, Inc., 829 F.2d at 544 (The Court held that since
"Congress intended section 881 to be a civil statute, we must now determine whether 'the clearest

proof' exists that the purpose or effect of the forfeiture is so punitive that it requires us to override
Congress' preference for a civil sanction.").
" See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960) (The Court held that "unmistakable
evidence of punitive intent ...is required before a Congressional enactment [regulating Social
Security] may be struck down.").
"See infra notes 200-44 and accompanying text.
I am not endorsing the "intent of the drafters" philosophy with respect to constitutional

interpretation. However, when looking at the constitutional history of the Ex Post Facto Clause, it
is striking that the framers were passionately concerned about the evil effects of retrospective laws.
The statements of the drafters concerning the need for the Clauso-so as to avoid the potential for
tyranny-and the values that were to be served by its incorporation into the Constitution, are forceful
reminders of the importance of such a prohibition. See Iredell, supra note 6, at 369. Furthermore,
these debates give some idea of what degree of proof should be required to justify the use of a
retrospective punitive law. For instance, Madison suggested that to survive a constitutional challenge,
the law must be required by "necessity" and in the interest of "public safety."2 FARRAN, supra note
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the punitive law takes civil or criminal form. Therefore, this sharp distinction
based on the form of the law is unjustified. In order to provide the protection
required by the Ex Post Facto Clause, the law's challenger should only be
required to put forth prima facie evidence of the law's punitiveness. Upon
such a showing, the burden should shift to the state, which then would be
required to negate the implication of punitiveness and to demonstrate that the
purpose of the law is regulatory, not punitive. If the law appears to be penal
in character, or a product of mixed regulatory and punitive motives, then it
should be struck down as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
This Article outlines the historical background of the Ex Post Facto
Clause, focusing on the intent of the framers and the Supreme Court's
narrowing of the Clause to apply only to criminal statutes and any civil
statutes that are unmistakably punitive in nature." The focus then shifts to
the problem of mixed motives in legislative acts, with particular emphasis on
a series of recent cases involving an ex post facto challenge to a law that
suspends the payment of social security benefits to incarcerated felons.14
Despite some evidence of punitive intent, courts have consistently found
that the suspension of prisoners' social security benefits does not violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause. The D.C. Circuit has called this the closest case,
implying that the civil statute was nearly an ex post facto violation, yet failed
to invalidate the law.16 Such holdings demonstrate the limitations that the
courts have placed on the use of the Ex Post Facto Clause in challenging civil
laws that are punitive in nature. Drawing from these judicial limitations and
the developing case law, this Article identifies the underlying factors that the
courts have used to gauge the punitiveness of a given provision and suggests
a more appropriate test for use in a civil law context1 7 Finally, this test is
applied to the social security law that has thus far survived ex post facto
scrutiny.
8, at 640. Interestingly, the same scholars that have been the main proponents of the "intent of the
draftlers"approach to constitutional jurisprudence have also argued for a more restrictive view of the

relationship between individual rights and the government. See James W. Torke, Book Review, 11
IND. L. Rv. 501 (1978) (reviewing BRUCE A. AcKEaMA,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CoNsrrrtroN (1977)). Yet here, if one were to follow the intent of the drafters, there would be a
substantial restriction on the power of the government to apply laws retroactively.
"The concept of punishment has been discussed by many legal commentators and philosophers
and is an enormously interesting and complex topic. While I draw on some of the insights of these
thinkers, the debate on what is punishment is beyond the scope of this Article. For insights on the
topic, however, I suggest HERBERT L.PACKER, THE LmnTs oF THE CRIMINAL SANcnoN (Stanford
University Press 1968); Ptu, BEAN, PuNISmENT (Martin Robertson & Co. 1981); and Henry H.
Hart, Jr.,
The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB& 401 (1958).
14See infa notes 200-44 and accompanying text.

"See cases cited bfra note 221.
"Wiley v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1120, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also infra notes 200-44 and
accompanying text (discussing congressional efforts to restrict social security benefits to incarcerated

felons).
" See infra notes 190-204 and accompanying text.
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L THE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL/CRIMINAL DISTINCTION
N THE Ex POST FACTO CLAUSE: THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS
The history of the Ex Post Facto Clause reveals the sharp
departure that the United States Supreme Court has taken from what

was originally intended when the Clause was included in the
Constitution." Early debates focused on the invidious nature of all
laws that had retrospective application." In addition, justices have
not universally agreed that the term "ex post facto" reaches only
retrospective criminal laws. For example, Justice Johnson in Satterlee
v. Matthewson ° strongly objected to the Court's holding in Calder
v. Bull2" that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied only to criminal
laws.' Furthermore, some scholars have argued that former Chief
Justice John Marshall opposed' the Court's holding in Calder. The
framers were clear on the harm to be avoided,2' and this harm can
take both criminal and civil form.
Having witnessed as colonists the potential for oppressiveness in
government, the framers considered protection against ex post facto
and other unjust laws essential for the new constitutional
government.' The ex post facto laws that the colonies suffered

' See Field, supra note 8, at 315-16. Field notes that it is unclear whether the Ex Post Facto
Clause would be found to apply only to criminal laws if the debate were to be reopened. Id. at 315.
Furthermore, Field notes that it was clear to many who debated the significance of the Ex Post Facto
Clause within various states' ratifying conventions that the Clause applied to civil laws. Id. at 322-26.
For example, George Mason argued that laws affecting the support of the value of paper currency
could be declared a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 323. Patrick Henry also presented
arguments based upon a belief that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied to civil enactments. Id. Note
that the language of the Ex Post Facto Clause places a restriction on the legislative branch,
prohibiting Congress, as well as the state legislatures, from passing any ex post facto law. See supra
note 7 and accompanying text. Literally, ex post facto means a law that is retrospective in that it
imposes a sanction for an act that was completed before the law's enactment. The scope of the ex
post facto prohibition has been a tcic of debate since its inclusion in the Constitution. Although the
Ex Post Facto Clause by its own terms applies only to legislative acts, the Due Process Clause has
been used to strike down attempts to retroactively apply expansive judicial decisions in the criminal
context. See Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972) (per curiam); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 347 (1964).
See supra notes 6, 8; infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Peters) 380 (1829) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
213 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
= Satterlee, 27 U.S. (2 Peters) at 414-16.
See Field, supra note 8, at 316.
See Iredell, supra note 6, at 369. The Ex Post Facto Clause was incorporated into the
Constitution late in the process. The original floor motion in support of a clause prohibiting ex post
facto laws and bills of attainder was introduced by Mr. Gerry and Mr. McHenry on Wednesday,
August 22, 1787. FARRWD, supra note 8, at 375.
See generally FARRAhN, supra note 8, at 375-76 (debates concerning the Ex Post Facto
Clause). The framers of the Constitution appear to have been determined to provide against the
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under British rule took the form of both civil and criminal statutes.26
Unfortunately, after the Revolutionary War, many states began to
enact similar legislation.2 ' Nonetheless, given the pernicious nature
of these laws, some of the framers believed that the prohibition
against ex post facto laws was so rooted in the very concept of the

rule of law that it need not be articulated in the Constitution.' Still,
out of caution the protection was incorporated into the body of the
Constitution.'
The body of the Constitution was chiefly concerned with

delineating the powers and functions of government; individual rights
within the new constitutional government were embodied in the Bill
of Rights. The fact that concern about "legislative excess" led the

framers to incorporate the Ex Post Facto Clause into the original body
of the Constitution is perhaps indicative of the importance attributed
to such provisions; rather than granting individuals the right to be free

reoccurrence of such abusive acts in the United States so that "bills of attainder and other acts of
party violence" might not ruin individuals here "as they [had] frequently done in England." 2
GRurmrn I. McREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMEs IREE.LL 173 (1949).
" Bills of attainder are a special kind of ex post facto law that are designed to convict persons
without providing the targeted individuals with the benefit of a judicial trial. Such laws are egregious
in effect and violate the concept of the separation of powers because the legislature is invading the
province of the judiciary. Other forms of ex post facto laws may have similar effect, but they
generally are not considered as pernicious as bills of attainder. However, like attainder, ex post facto
laws violate the separation of powers doctrine by invading the judicial province of meting out
punishment. Bills of attainder originated in England. For example, the Langcastrians and Yorkists
used acts of attainder as a tool to destroy each other. The Tudors also employed these devious acts
to further their aims. See THoMAs P. TAmWLL-LANGMAD, ENGLISH CONsrUrTINL HISTORY 26162 (10th ed. 1946). Furthermore, the Treason Act of Edward HI gave Parliament the power to create
ex post facto treasons. Id. at 573. And, Thomas Haxley was condemned to death in 1397 by an ex
post facto law. Id. at 195-96. Such an act was last used in England in 1696 against Sir John Fenwick.
See H. ST. CLAIR FELDEN, A SHORT CONSrrTTONAL HIwoRY OF ENGLAND 157 (3d ed. 1895).
2 Many states passed laws confiscating the property of those individuals who remained loyal
to England during the Revolution. Obviously, those loyalists had no notice that loyalty to the Crown
would cost them their property. Most of the egregious laws of the period took the form of bills of
attainder. Thomas Jefferson drew up a bill of attainder for the purpose of putting Josiah Phillips to
death for committing depredations and murders in Norfolk and Princess Anne. Phillips was attainted
on vague reports, not allowed to put forward evidence on his own behalf and eventually executed.
See JONATHAN Euor, 3 DETES oF THE SEvERAL STATE CoNvaerroNs ON THE AnoON OF THE
FEDERAL CoNsTrITmoN 66-67 (1836).
' See Oliver Ellsworth, Landowner, in ESSAYS ON THE CONsrrrmoN OF THE UNITED STATES
150 (B. Franklin 1970) (1892). Ellsworth argued that there was no need to incorporate an Ex Post
Facto Clause into the Constitution because it was unrealistic to believe that the government of the
newly formed republic would pass such laws. Furthermore, Ellsworth argued that since such a law
would violate the natural rule of law, it would be void without the aid of any additional constitutional
protection. Id. at 163.
See supr note 7 and accompanying text. The importance of the ex post facto provision to the
early Supreme Court can be seen in the case of Calderv. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). In this
case, Justice Chase noted that no people with a sense of reason and justice would entrust the
government with the power to pass ex post facto laws, because any such act by a legislature would
offend natural law even if it were not prohibited by the Constitution. Id. at 388.
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from such abuses, the framers instead directly curtailed governmental
power to enact ex post facto laws.'
This safeguard was built into the very concept of separation of
powers. 1 As James Iredell said, "This very clause I think is worth
ten thousand declarations of rights, if this, the most essential right of
all, was omitted in them."' Comments such as Iredell's reveal that
the framers were aware of the fact that legislators are human beings
subject to human frailties but imbued with the power to make law. If
such power were left unchecked during times of turmoil, legislators
would be in the position to infringe upon the rights of the individual.
Thus, the Ex Post Facto Clause provided an inherent limitation on the
law-making ability of the legislature.
Thus, 'the Ex Post Facto Clause serves a vital role in the
preservation of the essential values of a constitutional government that
is based upon separation of powers. Since retroactive legislation tends
to create instability, the framers incorporated into the Constitution the
notion that citizens should have fair notice of the laws that will be
affecting them and therefore, as a general rule, laws should operate
prospectively so as to provide such notice.' The requirement that
laws be prospective in their application would also ensure that
punitive legislation would serve its core purpose of specific
deterrence. Such a restriction on law making requires legislatures to
understand and respect the reliance of citizens upon the current state
of the law in order to protect the settled expectations of the nation's
citizens.
Fair notice, however, is not the only value recognized and served
through the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Clause also prevents the

The public concern about ex post facto laws was articulated by Madison in The Federalist
Number 43:
Our own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional fences against these

dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the Convention added this
constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights; and I am much

deceived if they have not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as
the undoubted interests of their constituents. The sober people of America are weary of

the fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret
and indignation that sudden changes and legislative interferences in cases affecting
personal rights become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and
snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the community ....
THE FEDERALiSr No. 43 at 244, 246 (James Madison) (Colonial Press ed. 1901).
" See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The ex post facto prohibition was considered so
important that it was a restriction placed upon both the state governments and the federal government
For a discussion of the importance of the Ex Post Facto Clause in the Constitution, see Breck P.
McAllister, Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme Court of the United States, 15 CAL. L. RLV. 269
(1927).
"

Iredell, supra note 6, at 368.
See Madison, supra note 30, at 246.
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punishment under recently enacted legislation of those persons who
were aware that their act was wrong, but not illegal, at the time of its
commission. Furthermore, the Ex Post Facto Clause prevents the
creation of statutes that are not universally applicable, but are instead
designed to apply to a particular person. The framers recognized from
their experience the potential for legislative abuse of retroactive
laws-laws that were often the tools of tyrants to achieve politically
motivated results. The Ex Post Facto Clause was designed to stand in
the way of such legislative vindictiveness. As stated by Alexander
Hamilton:
How easy it is for men ... to change their principles with their
situations-to be zealous advocates for the rights of the citizens
when they are invaded by others, and as soon as they have it in
their power, to become the invaders themselves-to resist the
encroachments of power, when it is in the hands of others, and the
moment they get it into their own to make bolder strides than those
they have resisted.'
The Ex Post Facto Clause was a tool by which the framers could
ensure that policies chosen by the government would either (1) apply
only to those who engaged in the precipitating behavior after the law took
effect or (2) be phrased at a level of such generality that it would be
impossible to identify in advance which and to what extent particular
individuals would be affected by the law. The concerns identified by the
drafters are as relevant today as they were two hundred years ago.
Government has expanded and the use of regulatory law to control
behavior has grown substantially since 1787. Today, just as in 1787,
citizens have not lost their need to have notice of what the consequences
of their acts will be, nor have legislators been visited with some divine
benevolence that prevents legislative vindictiveness."

' Alexander Hamilton, Letterfrom Phodon, in PAPERs 485, 542-543 (Jan. 1784), reprinted in
ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CoNsrMTION 132 (1964).
Unfortunately, the drafters' predictions about the foibles of legislators have proven to be
accurate. Many of the laws that have been challenged since the Clause's incorporation into the
Constitution have been the product of the inflamed passions of the legislature or the electorate. These
include laws that prevented entry into certain professions of persons who had been allied with the
CLINTON RossmrR,

Confederacy and, in the 1950s, persons who had been Communists. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603 (1960) (upholding the termination of old age benefits for an alien after deportation); Do
Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (upholding statute barring convicted felons from holding
office in a labor organization); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1953) (upholding statute allowing

deportation of aliens having membership in the Communist Party); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952) (upholding deportation of aliens due to membership in the Communist Party); United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (striking down a statute that prohibited certain persons from
government service based on prior supposed disloyalty); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898)
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The debate on the inclusion of the Ex Post Facto Clause gives
considerable insight into the intehded substantive content of the ex post
facto provisions. The fact that the debate includes discussion about the
Clause's applicability to civil laws' indicates that modem limitations on
the Clause37 depart from the drafters' intentions. Madison argued for an
expansive view of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In Madison's opinion, the Ex
Post Facto Clause should apply to retrospective civil and criminal
laws.' A motion to strike the Clause due to a fear that it would unduly
restrict the power of the government to act civilly was defeated during the

debate on the inclusion of the Clause." The federal convention notes
reveal that the Clause was incorporated with the intention that it would
cover all laws. Only when "necessity and public safety require them"
would retrospective laws be allowed.' In the words of James Iredell,
(upholding a statute barring convicted felons from the practice of medicine); Ex Parte Garland, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866) (striking down a law that prevented attorneys from practice until an oath
of loyalty was taken); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) (invalidating a law that
required priests to take an oath of loyalty).
"Madison assumed that the ex post facto prohibition would prevent the imposition of
retrospective civil laws. This is apparent from a debate on how the Ex Post Facto Clause interacted
with the Contracts Clause. The argument was made that the clause prohibiting the impairment of
contract was not needed because the Ex Post Facto Clause was sufficient to protect freedom of
contract. This belief is echoed by a question asked by Madison during the debate: "Isnot that already
done by the prohibition of the ex post facto laws, which will oblige the Judges to declare such
interference null & void?"JAMws MADISON, NOTS ON THE DEBATES iNTHE FEDERAL CONvENnON
OF 1787, 543 (Ohio Univ. Press 1984) (1840). Throughout the debate, the words ex post facto and
retrospective were used interchangeably. Furthermore, there is a notable lack of discussion on the
relationship between the Ex Post Facto Clause and criminal affairs as the debate is focused
exclusively on examples of civil disabilities. Id. at 541-44. For a discussion of the debate's focus on
the civil aspect of the Ex Post Facto Clause see Field, supra note 8. This Article also uses the debates
of the states on their constitutions to add to the argument that the Ex Post Facto Clause was intended
to cover all retrospective laws.
See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
"See Madison, supra note 30, at 246.
"See 2 FAIuRANI, supra note 8, at 617. The motion was made in a colloquy by Mr. Mason,
who was motivated by the fact that it was not clear that the phrase was limited to criminal cases. Mr.
Gerry spoke to this,
asserting that clearly the clause applied to civil cases as well as criminal laws.
Id. Mason later opposed the Constitution and cited this as one of his reasons. William W. Crosskey,
The Ex Post Facto and the Contracts Clauses inthe Federal Convention: A Note on the Editorial
Ingenuity ofJames Madison, 35 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 248, 252-54 (1968) (discussing the internal and
external inconsistencies of Madison's notes with respect to the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause).
,'On September 15, Mason noted:
Both the general legislature and the State legislature are expressly prohibited making ex
post facto laws; though there never was nor can be a legislature but must and will make
such laws, when necessity and the public safety require them; which will hereafter be a
breach of all the constitutions in the Union, and afford precedents for other innovations.
2 FARRAND, supra note 8, at 640.
The conversion from gold and silver to paper money provided the basis for an argument against
an absolute prohibition on ex post facto laws. In 1760, a dispute arose over the issuance of a bond
to be paid in "good public bills of the province of Massachusetts Bay, or current lawful money of
New England, with interest." Deering v. Parker, 4 Dall. 23, 23 (P.C. 1760), reprinted in 4 U.S. (4
Dall.) at 925. After the defendant in this case had made numerous payments, he tendered a large sum

332
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"Expost facto laws may sometimes be convenient, but that they are ever
absolutely necessary I take the liberty to doubt, till that necessity can be
made apparent." 4' At the time of the framing, the drafters expressed

concern that an absolute bar on retrospective legislation would make it
impossible for the new government to deal with problems as they arose
with any degree of flexibility! 2 However, they recognized that the

flexibility of the government must be tempered. As Iredell saidA man may feel some pride in his security, when he knows what he
does innocently and safely today in accordance with the laws of his
country, cannot be tortured into guilt and danger tomorrow. But if it
should happen, that a great and overruling necessity, acknowledged and
felt by all, should make a deviation from this prohibition excusable,
shall we not be more safe in having the excuse for an extraordinary
exercise of power rest upon the apparent equity of it alone, than to leave
the door open to a tyranny that it would be intolerable to bear? 43

The framers saw the evil as retroactivity in the law, whether civil or
criminal, although they conceded that on rare occasions such retroactive
civil laws may be justified. The idea of a general rule subject to rare
exceptions suggests that the framers believed that the prohibition of ex

in the bills of credit then current in New Hampshire which, if accepted, would result in the plaintiff
suffering a significant loss in value The plaintiff refused to accept the tender offer, and the
determination was made to divide the loss between the parties instead of adopting the plaintiff's
position to base the appropriate value on the price of silver at the time of the contract It was argued
by Lord Mansfield that although much could be said for adopting as a rule that the value at the time
of the contract, he believed that such a ulng would be inappropriate. Id. at 925-26.
Both the colonies and the states issued large amounts of paper money, often resulting in a high
level of inflation that led to an erosion of the currency's purchasing power. This left many persons
defrauded by the impairment of public credit since they were forced to tender their public debt
holdings for depreciated currency. The Ex Post Facto Clause that extended its protection to the states,
see supra note 7, included a clause prohibiting the impairment of the obligation of contract. The
purpose of this clause was to prohibit the states from passing stay and tender laws that prevented or
delayed the collection of private debts. Patrick Henry and George Mason objected in the Virginia
Convention that states and individual speculators had bought large amounts of paper money at a low
price. Furthermore, both objected that the Contracts Clause compelled payment in paper money at
the nominal value in gold and silver, and that the prohibition on ex post facto laws tied the hands
of both the federal and state governments to alter exchange values. This combination had lead to the
amassing of great fortunes by men who began speculating in the currency market. See DAVID
HuTcHnsoN, THE FOUNDATIONS oF rmE CoNs
IoN 155-60 (1975). In a letter to Governor
Huntington of Connecticut, Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth declared that the restraint on the
state legislatures regarding the "emitting of bills of credit, making anything but money a legal tender
in payment of debts, or impairing the obligation of contracts by ex post facto laws, was thought
necessary as a security to commerce, in which the interests of foreigners, as well as thecitizens of
different states may be affected."Id at 160.
" Iredell, supra note 6, at 368.
42 Id.
41

Id. at 369.
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post facto laws was best implemented by requiring the government to
carry the burden of justifying retroactive legislation on the basis of
extraordinary necessity. As the case law has developed, however, the
burden has shifted to the challenger of an ex post facto civil law to show
that the statute is both retroactive and "unmistakably" punitive." This
clearly is not the way the framers contemplated the application of the Ex
Post Facto Clause. In light of the drafters' intent, a reassessment of the
modem test used for ex post facto scrutiny of civil laws is necessary.
IL THE APPLICABILITY OF THE Ex POST FACTO CLAUSE
IN A CIVIL CONTEXT: THE COURT'S DEVELOPING DOCTRINE

The Supreme Court provided a definition of an ex post facto law in
its first case, challenging a law as ex post facto. The case, Calder v.
Bull," focused upon a resolution of the Connecticut legislature that set
aside a decree of a probate court and granted a new hearing on the
construction of a will. The definition established in Calder, which has
been drawn upon throughout the development of the ex post facto
doctrine, classified as ex post facto:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law,
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was
when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, than the
law annexed to the crime when committed. 4th. Every law that alters
the legal rules of evidence and receives less, or different testimony, than
the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order
to convict the offender.47
Criminal laws fall neatly within the ambit of ex post facto protection
as contemplated in Calder. The common denominator of all of the
contemplated laws is that they serve to increase punishment or the chance
of punishment. But the Calder language leaves a great deal to court
interpretation." The Court in Calder concluded that there was no ex
SFlemning v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960).

' Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 386 (1798).
"Id.
,Id. at 390.
This definition was simplified in United States v. Hall, 2 F. Ca& 366, 366 (C.C.D.C. 1809)
(No. 15,285), affid, 10 U.S. 171 (1810). Hall defined an ex post facto law as one that "in its

operation, makes that criminal or penal, which was not so at the time the action was performed; or
which increases the punishment; or, in short, which in relation to the offense, or its consequences,
alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage." Id.
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post facto violation because no vested property right had been disturbed.49 However, Calder prompted much discussion among the

justices.
The Calder Court split in many directions, as evidenced by the fact

that each justice wrote his own opinion about how the Ex Post Facto
Clause should be construed.' The opinion of Justice Chase introduced
the possibility that the Ex Post Facto Clause would be applicable in the

civil context,5 ' but Justices Paterson and Iredell each noted in separate
opinions
that the Ex Post Facto Clause should apply only in criminal
2
5

cases.

Despite the intimation by the Supreme Court in Calder that ex post
facto analysis was only to be applied to criminal statutes, twelve years

later the Court found that a civil statute that revoked land grants to bona
fide purchasers without notice offended the ex post facto provisions of
the Constitution, as well as the general principles common to our free
institutions.53 The Court noted that "[a]n ex post facto law is one that
renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable
when it was committed. Such a law may inflict penalties on the person,
or may inflict pecuniary penalties which swell the public treasury."'
5 the Court again
In its 1854 decision in Carpenter v. Pennsylvania,"
sought to confine the Ex Post Facto Clause to criminal laws. The Court
reasoned that since the debates in the federal convention had used

Blackstone's definition of the term "e post facto laws,"the Clause was
intended to be applied only to criminal statutes.' According to James
Madison, John Dickinson mentioned Blackstone's restrictive definition7
during the debate and opined that some further provision was needed to

" 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 394.
SoId. at 386, passim. In the end, the Court concluded that the resolution setting aside the decree
of the probate court and granting a new hearing on the construction of the will after the right of
appeal had expired was not an ex post facto law. Id. at 395.
"Id. at 394.
s2 Justice Paterson looked at the three guarantees of the clause, the ex post facto ban, the ban
on bills of attainder and the ban on contract impairments, and argued that the presence of the bar for
impairment of contracts suggested that the framers used the ex post facto prohibition in its "standard
meaning," referring to crimes, pains and penalties and no further. Id.at 397 (Paterson, J., concurring).
Justice Iredell looked to the purpose behind the Clause and argued that it did not extend to civil
cases, stating that "[s]ome ofthe most necessary and important acts of legislation are, on the contrary,
founded upon the principle, that private rights must yield to public exigencies." Id. at 400 (Iredell,

J., concurring).
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810).
Id. at 138.
58 U.S. (17 How.) 456 (1854).
U Id. at 463.
1 WrLLTA BrAcmoronE, Com!mETAtEs *46. Blackstone wrote that when "after an action
(indifferent in itself) is committed, the legislature then for the first time declares it to have been a
crime, and inflicts punishment upon the person who has committed it,"the legislature has created an
ex post facto law. Id.
'4
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prevent the imposition of retrospective civil laws.' William Crosskey,
a constitutional scholar, suggests that it is highly improbable that
Dickinson actually said this because the statement would have been
inconsistent with previous debates in which the Ex Post Facto Clause 9
was understood to be applicable to civil laws.' Crosskey suggests that
the reason for Madison to engage in such deception was his change of
heart in his old age about the power of Congress to regulate commerce.
During the first Congress, Madison had argued that the Congress was
constitutionally possessed of power "to regulate the mode in which every
species of business should be transacted,""6 but in his old age, he
retreated significantly from that position.'
Furthermore, some commentators who have reviewed Blackstone's
"definition" suggest that the idea that the Ex Post Facto Clause was to be
applied only in the criminal context is the result of a misinterpretation of
Blackstone. It appears to have derived from interpreting an example
offered by Blackstone as if it were intended to represent the exclusive
application of the ex post facto doctrine.63 The idea that the Ex Post
Facto Clause applied only to criminal statutes, as expressed in Carpenter,' was rejected twelve years later.6'
Although the Court has struck down many civil laws as violating the

Ex Post Facto Clause,

a reliance on the criminal-versus-civil "bright

line"test gives free rein to Congress and renews the possibility for the
type of legislative vindictiveness that prompted the inclusion of the Ex
Post Facto Clause in the Constitution in the first place.' Without some
idea of what distinguishes an improper civil provision from a proper one,
one is at a loss to determine if a retrospective enactment is subject to ex

,2 FARRAND, supra note 8, at 448-49.

See supra note 7.
,Crosskey, supra note 39, at 251.
Id. at 254.
'2 Id. The Official Journal of the Convention was published in 1819, but the most valuable
source of information about the debates, Madison's notes on the debates, was not published until
1840. See generally MADISON, supra note 36.
, See Field, supra note 8, at 327-28.
"58 U.S. (17 How) at 463.
, Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1866); see infra notes 79-96 and
accompanying text.
"See supra note 35 and accompanying text.

"Furthermore, even if such a distinction were functional, some retrospective criminal laws do
not offend the Ex Post Facto Clause. See, eg., Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) (death
penalty statute found only procedural when there had been a former death penalty statute in place

at the time of the act that had been declared unconstitutional under the state constitution); Beazell
v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925) (statute requiring joint trials for felons); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150

(1913) (conversion); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884) (statute enlarging class of persons competent
to testify). The suggestion that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal statutes parallels
the Court'streatment of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of creel and unusual punishments, which
has been held to apply only to criminal punishment. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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post facto challenge. This determination might turn on whether the

retroactive regulation is deemed to be regulatory or punitive in nature. An
ostensibly regulatory burden will not be deemed "punitive" if it directly

promotes the objectives of the overall regulatory scheme. As the Court
noted in De Veau v. Braisted:es
The question in each case where unpleasant consequences are brought
to bear upon an individual for prior conduct is whether the legislative
aim was to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the
restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to a
regulation of a present situation ....
69

The problem with identifying civil statutes that are punitive in nature
is that while some laws may be disadvantageous to those persons
retrospectively covered by the statute, the disadvantage may be "a

relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation." 7 These laws
with "mixed motives" create the greatest challenge for the courts.

It now appears settled that in order for a civil law to be invalidated
on ex post facto grounds, it must be both retrospective and punitive.
Today, the debate focuses upon the determination of the point at which
a civil statute becomes so punitive in nature as to violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause.

III. DETERMINING

PUNITIVE MOTIVE IN RETROACTIVE
CIVIL STATUTES

The criminal domain is not the only area of American law that

involves the application of punishments. Many laws that take civil form
in fact serve the purpose and have the effect of punishing an offender.73

363 U.S. 144 (1960).
0 Id. at 160.

n Id.

See supra notes 25, 66-69 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. Regulatory and punitive measures have much
in common; they both use general directives prohibiting or requiring described conduct and they both

use society's tribunals to enforce those directives. See Henry H. Hart, Jr., supra note 13, at 403.
7 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (act cutting off pay to certain named
individuals found by Congress to be guilty of disloyalty held to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause);
Schwab v. Doyle, 258 U.S. 529 (1922) (act applying a tax on the transfer of every decedent dying
after
its passage violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause when it applies to transactions consummated
before its passage); Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 381 (1878) (act imposing monetary penalty
on other goods for failure to pay additional tax on tobacco, enacted after the failure to pay such tax,
was found to be punishment and violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause); Cummings v. Missouri, 71
U.S. 277 (4 Wall.) (1866) (requiring Roman Catholic priests to take a test oath in order to continue
in their profession found to be punitive and therefore a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause); Ex
Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866) (act prohibiting attorneys from practicing law unless
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Although it is true that most punitive legislation takes the form of a
criminal statute, the harm exacted by ex post facto criminal laws, with
their potential to be unjust and vindictive, is no less significant when it
is exacted by what is in essence an ex post facto law enacted as a civil
statute. The concern surrounding the act of punishing conduct through
civil legislation is heightened by the expanded role of government
regulatory agencies. Government increasingly has the opportunity to
either punish conduct that was not subject to regulation at the time of the
act, or to change the punishment for the act after the fact by promulgating
new regulations.74 Examples of civil laws that are punitive in effect are
statutes that provide for punitive damages, penalties in a tax suit or the

loss of a license to practice a profession.
It is important to note that sometimes it is necessary to enact civil

statutes that are retroactive in order to ensure the efficient functioning of
a legitimate regulatory plan.75 Furthermore, many civil statutes that have

they first take an oath that they have never been hostile to the United States held violative of the Ex
Post Facto Clause); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (act purporting to annul a huge
land grant of the previous legislature held to be in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause). But see
De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (act disqualifying persons who have been convicted of
felonies, who have not subsequently been pardoned or had disability removed, from holding office
in any waterfront labor organization, held not to be in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause);
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (act calling for termination of alien's old age benefits
pursuant to § 202(n) of the Social Security Act after the alien was deported under § 241(a) of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act for having been a previous member of the Communist Party
found not punitive and therefore not in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522: 98 L.Ed. 911; 74 S. Ct. 737 (1954) (deportation of a resident alien shown to be a voluntary
member of the Communist Party not violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (deportation of legally resident aliens whose membership in the
Communist Party terminated before enactment of the Alien Registration Act of 1940 held not to be
punitive and therefore not violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause); Johannesen v. United States, 225
U.S. 227 (1912) (law depriving a person of citizenship when the person was never rightfully a citizen
held not to be punitive); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (act prohibiting any person who
has been convicted of a felony from practicing medicine held not to violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause); Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 456 (1854) (explanatory act refining a law
by defining property sulect to taxation held not to be punitive); Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8
Peters) 88 (1843) (law curing all defective deeds held to be civil and not violative of the Ex Post
Facto Clause); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (state resolution refusing to record a will
that allowed appeal in 6 months held not to be an ex post facto violation).
The use of civil law for punitive effect has been discussed most thoroughly in articles about
punitive damages. See Comment, CriminalSafeguards and the PAwntive Damages Defendant, 34 U.
C. L. REV. 408 (1967); Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of
Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L REv. 1158 (1966).
' For example, Minnesota recently adopted parole regulations that abolished the previous
system's requirement of an annual review of the inmate's release date. The practical effect of the
regulation is to modify substantially the punishment of the inmate. Nonetheless, this change was not
found to be in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150, 115657 (8th Cir. 1991), cer. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1516 (1992).
" For example, in Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984), the
Court upheld the application of a federal statute that resulted in the imposition of monetary liability
on an employer who withdrew from a covered pension plan before a statute allowing for such
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a retroactive effect are the result of judicial suggestion.76 Therefore, it
would be inappropriate for the courts to effect a bar against all retroactive
legislation. However, if legislation is tinged with a punitive motive, the
concerns that prompted many of the framers of the Constitution to adopt
a hard-line approach with respect to ex post facto legislation of any kind
are raised and should be addressed by the courts. In Burgess v.
Salmon, the Supreme Court recognized this concern, holding that the
effect of the Ex Post Facto Clause could not be evaded by giving civil
form to what is "essentially criminal."'78

The Court has provided some guidance in determining what makes
a statute punitive in nature. For example, in 1866, the Court struck down

as ex post facto a civil law that purported to set the standards for
specified professions in the state of Missouri.79 Missouri had recently
passed a new constitution that required all people to swear that they never

supported armed hostility against the United States governmentse
Citizens who failed to take such an oath could not exercise many of the
rights of citizenship."' Furthermore, they could not pursue certain
professions, such as that of a lawyer or a member of the clergy.'
Finally, under this statute if a person took the oath and committed
perjury, he or she was subject to criminal sanctions.'s Cummings, a
Roman Catholic priest, refused to take the oath and challenged it on a
number of grounds. One of Cummings's arguments was based on the
theory that such a statute was in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause."
The State of Missouri argued that the oaths were merely a legitimate
exercise of the state's power to regulate, and that the key to ex post facto
analysis was not that "it [rendered] a past innocent action a crime, but in
the fact that it undertakes, after so declaring, to punish it."" The State

damages was passed into law. The statute was signed into law several months before its effective
date. The five-month retroactive application period was upheld as rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. That purpose was to ensure that employers did not pull out of the plans while
the bill was before Congress. There was no showing of any punitive intent. In affirming the
retroactive application of the statute, the Court rejected the application of more restrictive tests for
retroactive laws. Id. at 731. These tests included assessing the reliance of the parties on the prAvious
state of the law, Id., the interest impaired, id. at 732-33, and the equities of imposing the legislative
burden and the impact of such burden on the parties. Id. at 733-34.
, See Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Cmstitutdly of Retroactive

Legislation, 73 HARv. L. Rzv. 692 (1960).
97 U.S. (7 Otto) 381 (1878).
7' Id. at 385.
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).

Id. at 279-81.
Id. at 281.
"Id.
"Id.
Id. at 281-84.
"Id. at 297-98.
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characterized punishment as the taking away of life, liberty or property.
Absent such an action, according to the argument of the State of
Missouri, there is no punishment, and where there is no punishment to be
found, there can be no ex post facto violation." In addition to this line
of reasoning, the State also argued that the Ex Post Facto Clause was
applicable only to criminal statutes.' However, the Court rejected the
State's contentions.
The Supreme Court found no correlation between the fitness for the
particular office and the qualifications included in the oathl According
to the Court, the statute revealed its punitive nature through its design to
reach the person, not the calling.' The oaths did not indicate fitness for
the job but instead reflected moral blameworthiness.' Furthermore, the
Court flatly rejected the argument that the sole indicator of punishment
was the taking of life, liberty or property.9 In the words of the Supreme
Court:
The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may
be punishment, the circumstances attending and the cause of the
deprivation determining this fact.. .
...
The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows. Its
inhibition was levelled at the thing, not the name. It intended that the
rights of the citizen should be secure against the deprivation for past
conduct by legislative enactment, under any form, however disguised.
If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the enactment, its
insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile proceeding 3

The Cummings opinion gives some insight into what constitutes
a punitive civil statute. First, the Court applied a relevancy test to
determine whether the qualifications for the profession were
reasonably related to the qualities sought in the particular profession.
In Cummings, the Court found no correlation.' Secondly, the Court
asked whether the statute was directed toward the person rather than
the thing to be regulated.95 Finally, the Court examined whether the

U Id. at 298.

'Id.

at 301.

aId. at 319.
"Id. at 320.
t Id.
" Id.
P

Id.

"Id. at 325.
"Id. at 319.
Id.
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law's effect was avoidable: "To make a right dependent upon an
impossible condition is equivalent to an absolute denial of the right
under any condition, and such denial enforced for a past act, is
nothing less than punishment imposed for that act. " '
In 1898, the Supreme Court in Hawker v. New York97 split 5-4
on an ex post facto challenge to another civil statute that regulated
qualifications for the medical profession. The statute prohibited
anyone with a former felony conviction from practicing medicine. Dr.
Hawker, a physician with a twenty-year-old felony conviction that had
occurred long before the enactment of the law establishing the "no
felony" criterion, challenged the law on the ground that it increased
the punishment for an offense committed before the law's enactment
and thus violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.98
The Court's majority analyzed the case by first establishing that
a state has the power to regulate the qualifications of its doctors; that
good moral character was a reasonable qualification for a person
entrusted with the public's health; and that the state's police power
included the power to presume conclusively that a person who has
committed a felony is not of good moral character." The Court
recognized the property value of the right to practice medicine,
but found that the effect on Dr. Hawker's property right was only
incidental to the legitimate purpose of regulating the profession, as
opposed to the central concern of the legislation."' 1 Hawker clearly
stands for the proposition that statutes that render prior conduct more

onerous than under the previous law do not necessarily violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause, provided the statute is not found to be punitive.
The Hawker Court found no ex post facto violation because there
was a reasonable, nonpunitive explanation for the law." The Court
distinguished Cummings by stating that the test oaths qualification had
no connection to the professions in that "many of the [required
affirmations] had no bearing on their fitness to continue in their
professions." 3 In Hawker, the Court found that the legislature had
made a permissible and reasonable inference from the existence of a
former felony conviction that the person did not have the necessary
moral character to be a licensed medical practitioner in the state."°
N

Id. at 327.

170 U.S. 189 (1898).
9Id. at 191.
"Id. at 193-95.
'" Id. at 191.

i Id. at 196.
202

Id. at 197.

...
Id. at 199 (quoting Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889)).
INId. at 197.
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Four justices dissented, stating that the statute was clearly
intended to increase the punishment for an act done before its
enactment, and arguing that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibited any
retroactive increase in the disadvantages that the offender had to bear.
The dissent noted that good moral character in the present is not
necessarily precluded by a former felony conviction. For example, the
dissent argued that the legislature's failure to take into account present
behavior, as well as the singling out of former felons, served as
indicators of the punitive intent of the statute, thereby making it
violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause.'
The Hawker dissent also identified as indicia of punitive intent
factors such as whether the challenged statute focused on moral
blameworthiness"e or identified a class of persons traditionally
subject to punishment and created a condition that made it impossible
for a person to opt out of the class." 7 Unfortunately, like the Court's
opinion in Cummings, Hawker gives little guidance as to how close
the correlation between the past act and the qualifications must be to
show that there is a regulatory rather than a punitive purpose for the
statute. Nonetheless, in light of the Court's decision in Cummings, if
a statute's effect on an individual based on a past act is found to be
punitive in nature, a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause will be
found to have occurred1 °8

IV. BALANCING PuNrrVE

INTENT AGAINST LEGITIMATE PURPOSE:

THE PROBLEM OF MIXED MOTIVES

The Court has held that civil laws are subject to ex post facto
analysis only when they are found to be punitive in nature."° The
question remains, however, of how to evaluate a statute appropriately
in light of the Ex Post Facto Clause when the statute includes some
indicia of punitiveness, but also has a legitimate nonpunitive purpose.
In other words, how punitive must a "mixed motive" statute be to
negate its legitimate basis?
All statutes are subject to due process review in order to
determine if at a minimum the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental goal."' When fundamental rights are
"IId. at
logId.

204 (Harlan. 3., dissenting).

Id. at 205.
See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
See Flemnming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960).
s See eg., Mathews v. deCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (upholding differential treatment
for wives who live with their husbands and divorced wives as the act could have been rationally
related to a legitimate goal and not merely "a display of arbitrary power").
'"
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involved, the degree of scrutiny increases. Generally, the justification
required of government tends to increase as the severity of the
restriction on the protected right increases."' For example, in this
context the Supreme Court has used the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to void some retrospective
legislation."' The framers of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clauses, however, did not design these amendments
specifically to cover retroactive legislation. Therefore, there is little
historical guidance as to when such retroactivity violates these
constitutional principles. The Ex Post Facto Clause, however, was
designed as a check on retroactive legislation. While the fact that the
Ex Post Facto Clause coexists with the Due Process Clause implies
that the mere recitation of a legitimate purpose in the face of evidence
of punitive motive is insufficient to survive ex post facto scrutiny,
case law indicates that there is a very strong presumption that a civil
law will survive an ex post facto challenge if there is any articulated
legitimate basis. 1
In 1960, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of when a
statute's purpose will be characterized as punitive in Flemming v.
Nestor.'1 4 The plaintiff challenged a law that terminated social
security benefits to an alien individual deported for being a
Communist pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act." 5 The
lower court had found the statute to be an unconstitutional violation
of the Due Process Clause."' After determining that the statute did
not offend due process, the Court turned to the ex post facto
claim. 7 The primary focus of the Court's analysis was to determine
if the law constituted punishment.1 The Court stated:
In determining whether legislation which bases a disqualification on the
happening of a certain past event imposed a punishment, the Court has
sought to discern the objects on which the enactment in question was
focused. Where the source of the legislative concern can be thought to be
the activity or status from which the individual is barred, the disqualification
. See, eg., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975) (upholding state statute that required a oneyear residency within the state before obtaining a divorce, relying on the fact that the law did not
amount to a "total deprivation," but "only [to a] delay" in a person's ability to obtain a divorce).
"12See Hochman, supra note 76, at 694.
. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (holding that if there is a valid
regulatory puirpose for a law, even evidence of a desire to penalize certain conduct will not vitiate
the law).
" 363 U.S. 603, 603 (1960).
5 Id. at 605.
"' Id. at 606.
"' Id. at 612.
Id. at 613.
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is not punishment even though it may bear harshly upon one affected. The
contrary is the case where the statute in question is evidently aimed at the
person or class of persons disqualified."1 9

The Court analyzed several factors to determine if the statute was
punitive. First, the Court noted that deportation was not considered
punishment under the developed case law and therefore should not be
considered additional punishment' 20 Secondly, the Court noted that the
challenged action was the "mere denial of a noncontractual government
benefit" and not punishment in the traditional sense. 2' The Court
determined that the primary focus for determining punitiveness is the intent
of the statute." While determining the intent of a statute is often
problematic, the Court provided some examples of how to approach this task.
For example, evidence of intent is often revealed by the legislative history,
the events that led up to the enactment of the law, other purposes that
underlie the statute, and the particular facts of the case."
The Flemming Court, however, stated that there must be "the clearest
proof of [punitiveness] to establish unconstitutionality of a statute on such a
The evidence of punitive intent must be "unmistakable. ' s
ground.'
Given this substantial burden, the Court found that the legislative history did
not prove that Congress was concerned solely with the grounds for
deportation and did not rest the operation of the statute on the occurrence of
an underlying act.26 The Court held that without such unmistakable
evidence, the presumption of legitimate regulatory purpose holds.
Furthermore, the Court counseled lower courts to refrain from inquiring into
the congressional motives that might underlie the outward nonpunitive
rationale. In the words of the Court:
Judicial inquiries into Congressional motives are at best a hazardous matter,
and when that inquiry seeks to go behind objective manifestations it
..Id. at 613-14.

'* Id. at 616-19. The notion that deportation is not punishment is a jurisprudential reality backed
by substantial case law. Although counter-intuitive, the immigration law has its own special rules,
including the determination that to deport is not to punish. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1953);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1951).
" Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617. This distinction is a curious one given the language of Cummings
and the fact that the taking away of benefits certainly affect one's property interest to one's
disadvantage. Femming has been cited for this proposition in other social security cases. The
right/privilege distinction has been eroded in the due process area. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970). Flemming does not rely on the nature of the benefit for its holding that the law does not
offend the Ex Post Facto Clause. Rather, the Court finds no punitive intent.
' F/emming, 363 U.S. at 617.
Id. at 614-15.

'1

W

Id. at 617.
Id. at 619.

1

Id. at 620.

'
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becomes a dubious affair indeed. Moreover, the presumption of
constitutionality with which this enactment, like any other, comes to us
forbids us lightly to choose that reading of the statute's setting which will
invalidate it over that which will save it. 7
The Flemming dissent, however, pointed out several flaws in the
majority's analysis. Justice Black indicated that the test used by the majority
amounted to a minimal scrutiny test of the Due Process Clause."
According to Black, an ex post facto law demands stricter review'2 by
virtue of the fact that the Constitution requires, by incorporation of the Ex
Post Facto Clause, that a law not only be rational, but also that it not
constitute retroactive punishment. Under this analysis, a duty of further
inquiry arises when the Court examines laws that apply retroactively. Black
further argued that several factors demonstrated the punitive nature of the
statute at issue in Flemming, not the least of which was the fact that the
statute was directed toward a clearly ascertainable group (Communists)."e
Justice Brennan in his dissent suggested an alternative test. He argued that
the Court should examine the act and its consequences to ascertain whether
there was a demonstrated congressional concern for administration of the
social security system in a manner that would require the government to focus
upon a particular group. 3 ' If so, then the statute should survive ex post
facto scrutiny in the face of two opposing inferences." In addition,
Brennan noted that the law terminated benefits only for certain categories of
deportees.'33 The common ground for those deportees whose social security
benefits were terminated was that they all had engaged in morally
blameworthy acts."3 That common characteristic lent credence to the claim
that the law was motivated by punitive intent.
The majority held that "omission of [certain groups of deportees from the
termination of benefits] cannot establish, to the degree of certainty required,
that Congressional concern was wholly with the acts leading to deportation,

" Id. at 617. The Court has often expressed the sentiment that it is reluctant to look into
legislative motivation. Se, eg., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). In O'Brien,the
Court noted that when there is a valid regulatory purpose for a law, even explicit proof of a desire
to penalize certain conduct (Such as burning draft cards) for other reasons (to suppress dissent) will
not vitiate the law. It can be argued that the principles underlying the Ex Post Facto Clause explicitly
call for judicial scrutiny of congressional motivations: the Clause is designed to curb vindictive acts
on the part of inflamed legislatures, which necessarily involves some assesment of the reasons for
the passage of retroactive laws. Id.

Flemming, 363 U.S. at 625 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 628.
Id. at 627.
. Id. at 637 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
L32 Id.
'

131

13

Id.

I" Id. at 638.
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and not with the fact of deportation.! ' The "degree of certainty required"
was not defined. However, that requirement, coupled with the Court'
additional requirement of "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent," '
seems to indicate that a very strong presumption of legitimacy
(nonpunitiveness) exists when there is a legitimate regulatory purpose for the
otherwise punitive punishment' 37 As a result of this apparent quantum and
characterization of the evidence required by the Flemming court, a litigant'
ability to show an ex post facto violation when the law challenged is a civil
statute is greatly reduced.
Flemmings restrictive standard for showing punitive intent may have
been moderated two years later in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez." While
the Court in this case never specifically addressed the quantum of evidence
required to allow a finding of punitive intent, the Court did consider the
constitutionality of acts of Congress that divested citizenship for evading the
draft by leaving the country.139 Like Flemmingb unique status as an
immigration case, Mendoza-Mai'nez was unique because it drew upon
Congress's war powers. Nevertheless, the Court found that denial of
citizenship was punitive and therefore could not in accordance with the Ex
Post Facto Clause4 be imposed on the basis of acts that occurred before the
law's enactment. 0
In Mendoza-Marlinez, the Court specifically detailed the factors to be
considered in determining whether a law was punitive or was instead
legitimately regulatory in nature. The indicators of punitiveness were
whether the [law] involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it
has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative
purpose to which it may be rationally connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned
141

Id. at 620. The Court appears to imply that unless a statute is wholly punitive, it would always
survive ex post facto scrutiny.
Id. at 619.
W

17See

Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (city's refusal

to change zoning restrictions from single to multifamily found to be constitutional); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250 (1976) (written personnel test used to determine whether applicants
possessed necessary verbal skills for police force work was deemed constitutional despite its
disproportionate impact on blacks because the "positive relationship between the test and the training-

course performance was sufficient to validate the [test]").
372 U.S. 144 (1962).
Id. at 146.

Id. at 169.
41Id.

at 168-69.
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It appears that the Mendoza-Martinez Court retreated from the aversion
to making any inquiry into legislative intent that was expressed firmly in
Flemming.1

In fact the Court specifically instructed that the legislative

history of an act should be analyzed in order to ascertain a punitive
intent 143 f however, conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the
penal nature of a statute cannot be found in the act's legislative history, it then
becomes necessary to consider the factors articulated by the Court.'" The
government offered nonpunitive rationales for the statute but the Court
45
rejected them.1
If Flemming appeared to mandate that any nonpunitive reason for a
statute should be accepted, then Mendoza-Marinez moderated that
proposition. The Mendoza-Marinez decision also serves to modify the
Flemming requirement that the punitive intent be established by
"unmistakable evidence"1 46 in that the Mendoza-Martinez decision allows
courts to apply common sense in assessing factors that are indicative of
punitive intent. In the wake of Mendoza-Martinez, it appears as if the
substantive standard articulated in Flemming has changed, although the Court
did not explicitly state this in the opinion. Such a change, however, can be
inferred from the facts of Mendoza-MaiWnez.4
In Nixon v. Administratorof GeneralServices,'" the Court was faced
with another determination of what constitutes "punishment" and how
punitive intent should be weighed against a legitimate purpose. The Court
again considered the substantive standard for determining punitiveness and
identified factors that indicate punitive intent. President Nixon sued the
Administrator of General Services to prevent the confiscation of his
Presidential documents. The Administrator sought to pursue confiscation
under authority granted by a recently enacted statute that allowed confiscation
to prevent the destruction of presidential papers." 9 President Nixon

See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
372 U.S. at 168-69.
IU See supra note 141 and accompanying
text.
141572 U.S. at 182. The government asserted that the motivation for the statute stemmed from
several considerations including the need to bolster soldier morale, to maintain military discipline,
and to promote the societal good by keeping people out of the country who choose to abandon it in
time of need. Id. at 189-90.
'" Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960).

..In the alternative, one could read this case much more narrowly. A narrow reading allows one
to conclude that where the law imposes an affirmative disability or restraint that historically has been
regarded as punishment, or if the law only comes into play on a finding of scienter and operates to
deter and exact retribution for conduct that is already a crime, then that law is "unmistakably
punitive" within the meaning of.Femming. A similar argument could be made if the law is found

to have no rational alternative purpose or is excessive in relation to an otherwise rational alternative
purpose.

433 U.S. 425 (1976).
"'

Id. at 429-30.

1992-93]

Ex PosT FACrO

challenged the law on the ground that it was an unconstitutional bill of
attainder.15°
The definition of punishment used in bill of attainder cases and in ex post

facto cases is essentially the same."1 In Nixon, the Court used a specific
analysis to determine whether the law at issue was punitive. 52 Under this
test, a court first determines whether the law takes the form of traditional
punishment, such as execution, "imprisonment, banishment, or the punitive
confiscation of property."' 53 Such laws, as well as legislative enactments
barring designated individuals from specific professions or employment, are
considered punitive.'" Even if the sanction does not fall within one of the
traditional notions of punishment, the Court noted that "new burdens and
deprivations might be legislatively fashioned and therefore found to be
punitive." 155
In light of the open-ended nature of the Court's approach, it is clear that
the Court analysis goes beyond historical experience and applies a functional
test that is similar to the test developed in Mendoza-Marlnez." That test
determines
[Whether the law under challenge, viewed in terms ofthe type and severity
of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative
purposes.... [W]here such legitimate legislative purposes do not appear, it
is reasonable to conclude that punishment of individuals disadvantaged by
the enactment was the purpose of the decisionmakers. 57
Such a test appears to indicate that the recital of a legitimate governmental

purpose is sufficient to override indications of punitiveness.
Because the act in Nixon reflected a clear congressional intent to preserve
presidential documents for posterity, as well as for use in a criminal

Im Id. at 468. Nixon asserted that "the Act is pervaded with the key features of a bill of attainder.
a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual
without provisions of the protection of a judicial trial."Id. The Cout said that it was not sufficient
to show that an individual or group is "compeled to bear burdens which the individual or group

dislikes"but that additionally, the act must be shown to be inflicting punishment. Id.at 470.

..Traditionally, bills of attainder were legislative acts that imposed the death penalty without
the benefit of trial. Laws that imposed lesser penal sanctions without benefit of trial were called bills
of pains and penalties. See Raoul Berger, Bills of Attainder: A Study of Amendment by Court, 53
CORNeLL L. REv. 355, 373-76 (1978); Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specfication: A
Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Cause, 72 YAIE LJ. 330, 330-31 (1962). The
Constitution contains two bill of attainder clauses that apply to the federal and state government See
supra note 7.
"I Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473-84.
u Id. at 474.

' Id.

,,2 Id. at 475.

,5 See supra notes 138.46 and accompanying text.
7 Nixo, 433 U.S. at 475-76.
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prosecution, the Court rejected Nixon's punitive arguments." The Court
found the legislative goals of the act to be within the legitimate exercise of
Congress's regulatory authority."
As evidenced by the Court's heavy reliance on the circumstances
surrounding the enactment of the statute, the Court in Nixon relied on an
analysis of congressional intent.'" Thus, the Court sent a signal to lower
courts reviewing laws for ex post facto violations to determine whether the
legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish.' Therefore, if
the legislative history of an act contains condemnation of behavior as morally
blameworthy it could be used as evidence to show punitive intent"'
The Court contrasted the lack of punitiveness in the Nixon case with the
evident punitive intent found in the law struck down as a bill of attainder in
United States v. Lovett.'" The Court in Nixon described the individuals
affected in Lovett as "subversive ...and ...unfit ...to continue in
Government employment."'" The Court noted, however, that something
less than an outright condemnation can establish punitive intent.'6 The
Nixon Court; however, provided little guidance with respect to legislation in
which punitive intent coexists with a legitimate legislative goal, because the
Court found no indication of punitive intent.'"
In the wake of Nixon, the Court addressed whether the denial of a
benefit to a discreet group of individuals constituted punishment for bill
of attainder purposes in Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public
Interest Research Group.67 In this decision, the Court upheld a federal
statute that denied federal higher education assistance to male students
who failed to register for the draft. In upholding the statute, the Court

' Id. at 476-77.
Id. at 477. The Court also noted that there appeared to be no less burdensome alternative that
would serve the legitimate ends sought. Id. at 483.
"I See id. at 478-80.
Id.

The Court in Nixon noted that the trial court had unequivocally found that there was no
evidence of an intent to punish presented at trial or reflected in the legislative record. The Supreme
Court found nothing in its independent examination of the legislative record reflecting a desire to
punish President Nixon. No aspersions were cast on Nixon's personal conduct and no condemnation
of his behavior indicative of a punitive intent appeared in the legislative history. The floor debates
on the measure were devoid of any evidence of an intent to encroach on the judicial function or to
punish an individual for blameworthy offenses. Id. at 477-78.
328 U.S. 303 (1946).
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 480.
"' Id. The Court looked at the factual realities of the case and determined that there were no
indications of punitiveness. For example, the law provided President Nixon with ready access to his
papers, the papers were housed where he had planned to house them, there were provisions for just
compensation if there were a taking of the property. Id. at 480-81. Furthermore, the General Service
Administration was directed to insure the protection of any party's ability to exercise "any legally or
constitutionally" available rights including the right to challenge the legality of the statute. Id. at 481.
"

Id. at 476-77.

'#468 U.S. 841 (1984).
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noted that it allowed students to receive benefits even if they registered
more than thirty days after their eighteenth birthday.' " Again, the Court
was able to avoid deciding the constitutional implications of a finding of
mixed motives because the Court found no punitive motive.
ChiefJustice Burger summarized in his majority opinion what constitutes
punishment for bill of attainder purposes. These guidelines are useful by
analogy when conducting an ex post facto analysis. '
In deciding whether a statute inflicts forbidden punishment, we have
recognized three necessary inquiries: (1)whether the challenged statute falls
within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the
statute, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed,
reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes; and (3)
whether the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish.170
The substantive standard governing ex post facto challenges to civil
statutes is convoluted and unclear. The Court has identified several factors
that indicate punitiveness, but has given little guidance as to the quantum of
proof necessary to show punitive intent. The presumption of legitimacy may
be so substantial that statutes that clearly reflect punitive origins may be saved
by merely reciting some regulatory basis for the law. Such a result is contrary
to the history of the Ex Post Facto Clause and to the values that it was
designed to serve."'
V. THE CONTRAST: Ex PosT FACTO IN THE CIMINAL SPHERE
Ex post facto analysis of criminal statutes has developed much as the
drafters might have intended. There is a presumption against retroactive
criminal laws and the burden of showing that the law is not punitive lies with
the law' proponent." This is in stark contrast to the ex post facto analysis
used when considering civil statutes. The degree of difference in the Court's
treatment of such laws is not justified in light of the history surrounding the
initial consideration of an ex post facto clause. 3 Nonetheless, the

'"Id. at 849.
IU See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
" 468 U.S. at 852. In applying these criteria to the draft registration requirement, the Court
found. (1) the denial of educational benefits did not constitute a punishment historically associated
with bills of attainder, (2) the denial reasonably furthered the nonpunitive goal of Imiting aid to those
people who fail to meet their responsibilities to the U.S. government; and (3) the legislative history
provided convincing spport that Congress sought to promote compliance with draft registration and

fairness in allocating scarce federal benefits.

" See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
See infi notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 6-8, 26-43 and accompanying text.
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substantive standard used in criminal statutes may provide some guidance for
a more equitable consideration of retroactive civil laws that are
disadvantageous and punitive in their effect.
In a rare 9-0 decision, the Supreme Court in Miller v. Florida"
outlined the test for determining when a criminal law offends the Ex Post
Facto Clause. The test employed by the Court consists of two critical
elements. First, it is necessary to consider whether the statute is
retroactive. If so, it becomes necessary to determine if the new law is
disadvantageous to the offender affected by it. If both determinations are
made, the law cannot be applied to the offender in question because to
do so would result in a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.1"
When James Ernest Miller committed his crimes, the sentencing
guidelines in place established a presumptive sentence of three and onehalf to four and one-half years in prison. 76 However, by the time
Miller was convicted, those guidelines had been changed so that the
presumptive sentence was five and one-half to seven years in prison."n
Under the new guidelines, he was sentenced to seven years.'" Had
Miller received seven years under the former guidelines, the judge would
have been required to give clear and convincing reasons in writing for his
deviation from the presumptive sentence and that exercise of discretion
would have been subject to appellate review.179 As this route for appeal
was foreclosed to the defendant, the sentence was challenged as a
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.ss
The government raised several points to overcome this ex post facto
challenge. First, the government asserted that no ex post facto violation
could have resulted because the law provided for the possibility that a
court could depart upward from the established guidelines.'
However,
this argument was rejected by the Court, which held that if such a

482 U.S. 423 (1987). The case was brought afler the defendant was sentenced under state

"

sentencing guidelines that were adopted alter the defendant engaged in the criminal act. Id. at 42425. These guidelines allowed the judge to sentence convicted sexual offenders to a prison sentence
in excess of what was allowable under the guidelines in effect at the time of the criminal act. Id. at
425. The U.S. Supreme Court held in this case that defendant Miller should have been sentenced
under the guidelines in place at the time of his offense because by retrospectively applying the
change in the law to him, he had been disadvantaged in the sentencing process. Id. at 435. That
disadvantage was substantive, not procedural. Id. at 434-35. That was enough, however, to invoke
the protection of Article 1 of the Constitution.
Id. at 430.
Id. at 424.

Id.
Id.

177
17!

11 Id. at 426.
' Id. at 423. Many of the recent ex post facto challenges that have been heard by the Supreme
Court originated in Florida. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S.
282 (1977).
"I Miller, 482 U.S. at 430-31.
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provision could save a statute, it would swallow the effectiveness of the
Ex Post Facto Clause.'"
The government next argued that the new law was not more onerous
than the law in place at the time the petitioner committed the unlawful
act." The Court rejected this argument on the grounds that the revised
guidelines exposed the petitioner to a greater possible sentence, in the
absence of explanation by the court, than he could have received under
the former guidelines." However, if the law had been a civil statute,
in the absence of a showing of clear punitive intent the fact that the
statute was designed to increase judicial efficiency would probably have
been a sufficient legitimate basis to overcome the disadvantage to the

particular individual
The Court held that Miller did not need to prove that he would have
received a lesser sentence in order to show an ex post facto violation.'"
The Court found it sufficient that the law substantially disadvantaged the
petitioner by taking away-the opportunity to have the lower presumptive
sentence.' This loss of opportunity was sufficient to establish an ex
post facto violation.'
In contrast, in light of the Court's earlier
decisions," the loss of opportunity in the civil context would not be
considered punitive per se and would probably not overcome a purported
legitimate basis.'"
Finally, the government attempted to characterize the change in the
law as procedural. The Court rejected this labeling, holding that the

guidelines constituted substantive law that served to strictly define the

m

ld. The Court distinguished Dobbert by pointing out that in Dobbert the defendant had notice
that he could face death and he received that sentence. Here, the petitioner had notice of a possible
five-and-a-half year sentence and received seven-and-a-half years in prison.
" Id. at 431. The Court noted that the change in the offense-scoring points alone made the
statute factually more onerous. The legislative history of the statute indicated that the purpose of this
change was to increase the punishment of sexual offenders. Id.
1 Id. at 425-27. Under the Florida guidelines, sentences were determined by a total offense score
which was tallied for each defendant based on prior convictions and present convictions. Using a
grid, the total offense score indicated the presumTive sentence for the primary offense. The new
guidelines raised by 20% the number of points assigned to a sexual offense and therefore raised the
total number of offense points for the petitioner. The higher score necessitated a longer presumptive
sentence. Under the previous law, the petitioner would have had a lower offense score and a lesser
presumptive sentence. Miller could have received the greater sentence under the old guidelines, but
this would have required written reasons. The Court found nothing ameliorative about the statute to
distinguish it from Dobbert. Id. at 426-27.
Id. at 432.
1U Id.
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
1
See supra notes 109-71.
1k For example, the enactment of a civil statute that served to restrict an incarcerated felon's right
to receive social security was not considered to be punitive per se as evidenced by the fact that courts
were willing to look for a legitimate, nonpunitive congressional intent. See hzfra notes 226-39 and
accompanying text.
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exercise of judicial discretion."'o The Court found that this new law had
directly and adversely affected Miller's sentence and that an Ex Post
Facto Clause violation
could not be avoided by calling the new law a
' 191
change."
"procedural
As stated above, the Miller case establishes a test for assessing if a
criminal law as applied violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. The case stands for
the proposition that if a criminal law is retrospective, and the law
disadvantages the offender affected by it, then the law runs afoul of the Ex
Post Facto Clause.'92 Whether a defendant is disadvantaged is determined
by assessing the impact the application of the new law has on the defendant.
If the offender receives a greater sentence or is deprived of substantial rights
that he or she would have had under the old statute then he or she is
disadvantaged. 3 Furthermore, only the potential for more onerous
treatment need be demonstrated under the challenged criminal statute; the
defendant need not demonstrate that a less harsh result would in fact have
occurred under the old law.'9 ' In the criminal context the judicial focus is
on the effect of the law on the offender rather than the laws overall intent.
In the civil context, however, the Court looks toward the intent of the
legislature. Any individual effect may be considered merely an incident of a
legitimate regulatory scheme. '
Unlike retroactive criminal laws, retroactive procedural changes in the law
that are not intended to work to the disadvantage of an offender are not
prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause.'9 To determine if a law constitutes
a mere procedural change, the Court attempts to determine if the purpose of
the statute is ameliorative 97 by examining its effect and its legislative
19
history. 8
In the criminal context the Court will look behind the statute' purported
justification to its effect. In the civil context, however, it appears that if there
' 482 U.S. at 435. Florida asserted that the guidelines were merely to guide and channel the
sentencing judge's discretion much like parole guidelines that have withstood ex post facto scrutiny.
Id. The Court rejected the analogy, stating that parole guidelines were not laws whereas here, the
Florida Legislature had promulgated a law. Secondly, these were not 'flexible guideposts"; the
legislature had created a high hurdle for the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing. Id.
191Id.
,92
Id. at 430.
19

Id.

Id. at 432.
"See supra notes 139-46 and accompanying text, and cases cited infra notes 224-25, 236-37.
'"Miller, 482 U.S. at 432.
"' Ameliorative in this context means that the statute is intended to remedy some problem in the
functioning and application of the law and is not directed toward further punishment. If the statute
results in greater protection for the rights of accused or convicted persons, then it is not punitive and,
"1

therefore, not covered by the Ex Post Facto Clause. If the statute works to the substantial
disadvantage of the offender, the court will treat it as a substantive law, not a procedural change and
not ameliorative. Id.
1"Id.
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is any rational basis for the purported justification, it will be accepted by the
Court and the burden will fall on the law opponent to demonstrate that the
rationale is irrational or that the punitive purposes of the law unmistakably
outweigh the purported legitimate basis.'"
VI. THE PROBLEM OF MIXED MoTIvEs: A CASE ANALYSIS
The problem of creating an inordinately strong presumption of
legitimacy for challenging a retrospective civil law is best demonstrated
by looking in detail at recent lower court cases that have considered ex
post facto challenges against civil laws. One ex post facto challenge in
particular demonstrates the need for a more substantive analysis of the
harm posed by retrospective application of civil legislation.
At roughly the same time that the Supreme Court was reviewing its
latest ex post facto challenge to a criminal statute, the lower courts were
reviewing a possible punitive sanction clothed in civil form. The
challenge concerned a change in social security law that prohibited the
payment of benefits to incarcerated felons. The law retrospectively
suspended the benefits of prisoners who were receiving benefits at the
time of the law's enactment. The lower courts have consistently held that
2°°
this law does not amount to a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
In 1979, Congress was alerted to the fact that David Berkowitz, the
celebrated "Son of Sam"killer, was allegedly receiving an array of social
security benefits.2 0 ' Inflammatory newspaper articles detailing Berkowitz'sreceipt of benefits suggested that up to 30,000 prisoners nationwide
were receiving $60 million annually in disability benefits alone. °2
These accounts were later determined by the Congressional Research
Service to be greatly exaggerated, but the initial public outcry generated
a swift and predictable response from Congress. 0 3
"

'

See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
See infa notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH

SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS

PuB. No. 81163, SocA.iA SEcuRrry BmmEtmrs FOR PRISONERS 2 (1983) [hereinafter CRS RPORI].

Berkowitz had been terminated from the Social Security rolls at the time of the articles.
.Id. at 2.
' Data from the sample of prisoners conducted by the General Accounting Office revealed that
only 224 prisoners in federal penal institutions, out of the total of 17,000 possessing Social Security
cards, were receiving some form of Social Security benefits as of April 1980. CRS REPORT, supra
note 201, at 2-3. A more extensive GAO study conducted in July 1982 concluded that 4300 inmates
in state and federal penal institutions (out of a total population of 314,000) were receiving disability
benefits in 1980, when the enactment of Public Law No. 96-473 rendered them ineligible. The GAO
found that 82% of prisoners formerly receiving disability benefits had become disabled prior to their
incarceration. The GAO study also found that only 1376 felons nationwide were receiving the old-age
and survivors' insurance benefits subsequently affected by 42 U.S.C. § 402(x) (1988). CRS REPORT,
supra, at 5-6.

354
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Numerous bills restricting or eliminating social security benefits to
prisoners were introduced in the 96th Congress. In 1980, the House
Subcommittee on Social Security held widely publicized hearings on the

subject.

4

During those hearings numerous members of Congress came

forward detailing the complaints of constituents that prisoners would be
eligible for Social Security benefits and calling for swift action to suspend

such benefits." 5 Representative Whitehurst, the chief architect of the
proposed legislation prohibiting prisoners from receiving benefits, stated
that the purpose of the bill was to "make crime stop paying in our
country" by "end[ing] this preposterous system of subsidizing criminals

with this Nation's precious social security dollars." ' Testifying in
support of similarly restrictive legislation, Congressman Courter noted
that "these payments are unfair to the general public, which prefers to

believe that once a convict is behind bars, he will be punished for his
crime."2 7 Representative Daniel stated that "[i]nstead of punishing [the
criminal], we are paying him overtime." 2 He volunteered that
convicted felons should be deprived of their entitlement to social security
benefits "Oj]ust as [they] are generally deprived of their right to vote." 2"

The legislators were not unaware that their action might tread on ex
post facto grounds. Several witnesses and members of the Committee
expressed the fear that retrospective suspension of Social Security benefits
to prisoners would not survive a constitutional challenge based upon the
Ex Post Facto Clause." Representative Jacobs specifically noted that
the retrospective disabilities imposed on prisoners by the legislation under

consideration bore striking similarity to the retroactive financial penalties

See Receipt of Social Security Benefits by Persons Incarceratedin Penal Institutions: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980) [hereinafter Hearings].
" Se e g., Hearings,supra note 204, at 2 (remarks of Rep. Pickel); id. at 4 (statement of Sen.
Wallop); id. at 10 (statement of Rep. Whitehurst).
' Id. at 8 (statement of Rep. Whitehurst). Rep. Whitehurst also statedAnd like you Mr. Chairman, I, too, agree that it is ridiculous for someone like David R.
Berkowitz, New York City's "Son of Sam"mass murderer, to be allowed to collect several
hundred dollars each month in social security benefits because of some asinine
qualification procedure. For what possible reason can there be in paying an animal like
this from our country's already strained social security fund? What must the families of
this creature's victims think? Have our laws become so inflexible that our social security
administrators must bend over backwards to make sure that another parasite is added to
suck the life out of the social security host?
Id.
" Id. at 24 (statement of Rep. Whitehurst).
13 Id. at 83.
20Id.

2,' Se4 e.g., id. at 2 (remarks of Rep. Conable); Id. at 24, 29, 39 (remarks of Rep. Pickle); Id.
at 37-38 (statement of Lawrence Thompson, Associate Commissioner for Policy, Social Security
Administration); id. at 57 (statement of Steven R. Schlesinger, Associate Professor, Catholic
University).
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invalidated under the Ex Post Facto Clause in Hiss v. Hampton1 The
subcommittee initially moved to consider the potential ex post facto
conflict by proposing that any statutory restriction on the receipt of social
security benefits by prisoners be wholly prospective by applying the
statute only to persons convicted and incarcerated after the enactment of
the prohibitory legislation."' Congress did not adopt the prospective
response, but instead adopted a retrospective law prohibiting the payment
of social security disability to claimants who were incarcerated felons
regardless of whether the claimants had committed their crimes before the
law's passage. The law did provide that if the felon was in a courtapproved rehabilitation program while in prison, his or her benefits would
be reinstated. 13
Some nonpunitive reasons were offered for the prohibition. A few
representatives testified that eliminating the payment of social security
benefits to inmates was consistent with a sound fiscal policy as the needs
of the inmate were already met. The Senate Report accompanying H.R.
5295 sought to explain the motivations of the House of Representatives:
The committee believes that the basic purposes of the social security
program are not served by the unrestricted payment of benefits to
individuals who are in prison or whose eligibility arises from the
commission of a crime. The disability program exists to provide a
continuing source of monthly income to those whose earnings are cut
off because they have suffered a severe disability. The need for this
continuing source of income is clearly absent in the case of an
individual who is being maintained at public expense in prison.2 "
The Committee Hearings also suggest another nonpunitive purpose
for the suspension of payment of benefits to incarcerated felons. The
Committee received evidence that cash payments to prisoners created
211338 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1972). In the Alger Hiss case, the court held that a statute

requiring the Civil Service Comnission to deny federal old-age insurance benefits to former

employees who had falsely testified in connection with a mater involving national security or who
had falsely answered questions concerning membership in the Communist Party was void as a
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 1153.

2'aSee Hearings, supra note 204, at 40 (remarks of Rep. Pickle) (noting that he was assuming
that the restriction of social security payments would only apply to those who acted criminally after

the enactment of the restrictive law); id. at 57 (statement of Prof. Schlesinger). A blanket provision
precluding payment of benefits to anyone who had been convicted of a subversive crime was
abandoned in favor of a discretionary and prospective amendment after members of the Conference
Committee expressed reservations that the original proposal would violate the ex post facto
prohibition. See H.L REP. No. 2936, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-37, reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3954, 3966-68; see also 102 CoNG. Rm 13,093-94 (1956) (remarks of Sen. Williams); CRS REPoRT,
supra note 201, at 2.
42 U.S.C. § 402(x) (1988).
S. REP. No. 987, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4787, 4794.
S1
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discipline problems within some prisons as inmates used the money as
capital to support dealings in illicit commodities.2 5 In other instances,
fellow prisoners
allegedly "strong-armed" the payments from the
216

recipients.
In 1983, the suspension of social security disability benefits to
incarcerated felons was extended to include old-age retirement benefits. 2'7

There is virtually no legislative history pertaining to this exten-

sion. During floor debates on the proposed extension of the prisoner
suspension provision, the sponsor of the Senate amendment, Senator

Grassley, candidly stated that "[t]he basic goal in adopting such a law is
not to [save] revenues. ' 218 He referred to comments from angry
constituents criticizing the receipt of social security benefits by incarcerated felons. Furthermore, Senator Grassley went on to urge the inclusion
of the amendment in order to send a signal to Americans that Congress
was serious about eliminating benefits to such "unintended
recipients.,

29

The

Conference

Committee

accepted

the

Senate

amendment that served to deny Social Security old-age benefits to
incarcerated felons2 °
Since 1980, many persons retrospectively affected by the 1980 and
1983 amendments to the social security laws have unsuccessfully

challenged them on ex post facto grounds." Most courts disposed of
the claims in short, conclusory opinions that merely state that there is no
ex post facto violation.m While this could be a result of the limited
legal resources available to a pro se litigant, it might also be the result of
the courts' application of Flemming to support the proposition that the
taking of a social security benefit is never punishmen t m Many courts
252

Hearings, supra note 204, at 64, 68.

Id. at 25, 28.
Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L No 98-21, § 339(a), 97 Star. 65, 133-34 (1983)
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C § 402(x) (1988)).
211 129 CoNG. Rnc. S3627 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1983) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
2 Id. at S3628.
't,

*Id.
See Wiley v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Zipkln v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 16, 18-19
(2d Cir. 1986); Buccheri-Bianca v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 1152, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 1985); Jenson v.
Heckler, 766 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 945 (1985); Washington v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 718 F.2d 608, 611 (3d Cir. 1983); Greenwell v. Walters,
596 F. Supp. 693, 696 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Hopper v. Heckler, 596 F. Supp. 689, 693 (M.D. Tenn.
1984); Pace v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 399, 401-02 (S.D. Tex. 1984); Anderson v. Social
Security Administration, 567 F. Supp. 410, 413 (D. Colo. 1983).
m
See cases cited supra note 221.
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). The argument has been made that since social
security benefits are mere noncontractual government benefits, their suspension is never a
punishment. Id. at 617. This flies in the face of case law that has traditionally advocated a factual
determination of whether an imposed disadvantage constitutes a punishment. As noted in Cummings
v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866): "The dcprivatiofi of any rights, civil or political,
previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation
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have found that this is a purely regulatory statute and therefore is not
punitive. Under such an analysis, the law would survive a constitutional
attack under the Ex Post Facto Clause.'
Those decisions that do
include a discussion supporting the constitutionality of the social security
amendments indicate that the holding is based upon the finding of a
legitimate, nonpunitive governmental purpose for the amendments.'
It appears that even a very weak nonpunitive reason for a statute may
make it immune from an ex post facto challenge.
This willingness to accept weak nonpunitive governmental interests
in upholding constitutional challenges to the social security amendments
under the Ex Post Facto Clause is evident in the D.C. Circuit's holding
in Wiley v. Bowen. 6 In Wiley, the government argued that the suspension of social security benefits is a legitimate exercise of regulatory
power as opposed to a punitive measure. The government argued that the
needs of incarcerated persons are provided for by the state, thereby
eliminating the need for a continuing source of income. 7 The government's analysis was based upon the holding in Flemming that absent
"unmistakable evidence of punitive intent," there is no ex post facto

violation,
To support the argument that the government's actions unmistakably
lacked punitive intent, the Social Security Administration noted that under
the law benefits are suspended only during the time the recipient is
incarcerated. The Administration noted that if Congress wanted to punish
felons because they were morally blameworthy, it would have made the
disqualification permanent, not temporary.? Second, the government
argued that the suspension of benefits does not attach to particular
conduct, but hinges on the state of incarceration. ' Finally, it was noted
that family members who qualify using the incarcerated felon's earnings
can still receive social security benefits

determining the fact."Id at 320. The Court has also refused to require that a loss be of avested right
before it is considered punishment. The right/privilege distinction has eroded. See Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
' See. &g., Andujar v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 404 (1lth Cir. 1986); Jones v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 997
(10th Cir. 1985); Jenson v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 311 (1985);
Hopper v. Schweiker, 596 F. Supp. 689 (MI.D. Tenn. 1984), affdper curiam, 780 F.2d 1021 (6th Cir.
1985), cert denied, 106 S.Ct. 1522 (1986); Pace v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Tex.
1984); Anderson v. Social Security Administration, 567 F. Supp. 410 (D. Colo. 1983).
See, ag., Jones v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1985).
824 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The author was attorney of record in the case.
Id. at 1122.

Id. at 1121-22 (discussig Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960).
' Brief for Appellee, Wiley v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Appellee's
Brief] (citing Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841,
853 (1984)).

Appelle's Brief, srqra note 229, at 17.
'

Id.
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reviewed the
claim that the retroactive suspension of Social Security benefits was
barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause and found, like all other courts
that had considered the measure, that the law was constitutional. The
court reached its decision after applying the standard articulated in
Flemming v. Nestor,' expressing some discomfort with the
decision: "Nevertheless, we pause to note that appellant's expostfacto

claim is a troublesome one. Indeed, it appears that in this case
Congress has come about as close as possible to the line of
unconstitutionality without actually crossing it." 3 The court noted
that the principal justification for the statute, to eliminate payment of
retirement benefits to individuals whose basic needs are already
provided at public expense, is undermined by restricting the law's
applicability to incarcerated felons. The singling out of felons "makes
one quite suspicious that its intent was punitive."' The court also
noted that the legislative history reflected a punitive motivation.'
Nonetheless, the court ultimately relied upon the Flemming Court's
statement that "[j]udicial inquiries into Congressional motives are at
best a hazardous matter."' As a result, despite the evidence of
punitive intent, the court concluded: "Thus, we are left with the rule
that 'only the clearest proof could suffice to establish the
unconstitutionality of a statute' on the ground 'that a punitive purpose
in fact lay behind the statute."'" 3
In light of Wiley, it is clear that the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia endorses the view that in the
area of civil statutes there must be "unmistakable evidence of punitive
intent ...

before a Congressional enactment of this kind may be

struck down."'
Wiley is clearly a case involving a mixture of
legitimate nonpunitive motives with punitive intent. Yet the court
credits the nonpunitive rationale. Therefore, the burden of overcoming
the strong presumption of legitimacy necessary to prove an ex post
facto violation approaches insurmountability. 9
-2 363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960).
Wiley, 824 F.2d at 1122.
Z4Id.

2

Id.
'Id.

"

Id.

Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960).
There are several ways that the Wiley decision can be interpreted. One could argue that it is
just a misapplication of the standards for detecting punitiveness laid down in cases involving the
rights of convicted felons, as modified by post-conviction legislation. See supra notes 174-95 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the treatment of such a law by the Court in Miller v. Florida,
482 U.S. 423 (1987). However, its reasoning is a logical extension of the manner in which courts
have treated cases involving statutes that reveal mixed motives. See ag., Flemming v. Nestor, 363
2

'
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The substantive standard is different when a statute is criminal; if a
criminal statute retrospectively burdens an offender, unless it can be
shown to be ameliorative or purely procedural, it violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause." ° In the civil context, however, the law is presumed to
be regulatory absent a significant showing of "unmistakable evidence of
punitive intent."" Therefore, if a civil statute retrospectively disadvantages the one affected by it, he or she must show that it is not ameliorafive or procedural."4 In the civil context the plaintiff bears the burden
of showing the statute is punitive and the presumption of regulatory
purpose is extremely strong 2 3 In the opinion of the author, the strength
of the presumption of legitimacy is inconsistent with the intent of the

framers and the values that underlie the Ex Post Facto Clause.2'
VII. A BETTER TEsT: BREAKING DowN THE CiVL/CRimiNAL
DISTINCTIoN IN Ex PosT FACTO LAW

In order to reassess the Court's developed case law dealing with ex
post facto challenges to civil statutes, it is important to determine why
there is a strict distinction between civil and criminal laws in determining
the degree of punitiveness required in order to assert a successful
constitutional challenge under the Ex Post Facto Clause. When analyzing
civil statutes for ex post facto violations, what does it take to show
punitive intent, and when does punitive intent vitiate an otherwise valid
retroactive statute? Flemming v. Nestor argues for "unmistakable
evidence" when dealing with civil laws.24 Clearly, if there is an
articulated, rationally related nonpunitive reason for the statute, that
reason will be weighed against the punitive intent. But there is some case
law that suggests that the articulation of any nonpunitive ground for the
statute will ensure constitutional validity." This, of course, serves to
preclude a serious ex post facto analysis in the civil area as such a
standard rests upon a rational relationship test that requires minimal
scrutiny. Because the Supreme Court has stated that punitive measures
cannot be disguised in civil fohne 7 civil statutes that pass due process
U.S. 603, 619 (1960).
"* See Miller, 482 U.S. at 432.
F/emming, 363 U.S. at 619.
See Miller, 482 U.S. at 430.
" Flemming, 363 U.S. at 619.
'"See supra notes 6, 8, 30-34 and accompanying text.
363 U.S. at 619.
Wiley v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Wiley seems to indicate that if there are
mixed motives, one nonpunitive, the other punitive, the court will credit the nonpunitive purpose. The
court noted that "[j]udicial inquiries into Congressional motives are at best a hazardous matter."Id.
at 1122 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
" Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1866); see supra notes 88-96 and
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scrutiny when applied prospectively should also be subject to more
stringent ex post facto scrutiny if applied retrospectively.
Ex post facto scrutiny of a criminal law does not involve speculation
about possible nonpunitive rationales for such statutes. Instead, the court

is instructed to determine if the change in the law serves to make the
punishment of the offender more severe. If the law is found to disadvan-

tage the persons affected, there is a presumption against an "ameliorative"
purpose."
It is unclear why courts have adopted such a complicated ex post
facto analysis when the challenged statute is purportedly civil in

nature.

9

While the need for flexibility in government supports the

position that the person challenging the law should bear the burden of

proving that a retrospective civil law is punitive, it does not logically
follow that the presumption of regulatory character and lack of punitive
intent should be so strong as to foreclose any serious constitutional
challenge under the Ex Post Facto Clause.' The underlying concerns
of fair notice and the need to curb legislative vindictiveness that
prompted the inclusion of the Ex Post Facto Clause do not rest upon a

distinction about the form of the law."s In fact, these evils were "selfevident" to the drafters.' 2 As the government's power grows through
the use of civil regulation to control behavior, the need to curb legislative
vindictiveness and to ensure fair notice becomes increasingly important.
Nonetheless, current case law seems to indicate that ex post facto claims
against civil laws may be essentially unrecognizable. 3
This sharp distinction between the constitutional tests applied to
criminal laws and punitive civil statutes lacks any legitimate historical or
jurisprudential basis. In this respect, the Court has failed to provide
meaningful guidance for legislators, litigants and the lower courts with
respect to what factors indicate that a civil law is punitive and what
quantum of evidence is necessary to support a judicial finding that the
civil statute is unconstitutionally retrospective in its application. And

while the intent of the drafters may have been to place the burden of

accompanying text.
See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1987).

Of course, criminal laws are presumed to be penal in nature while civil laws are presumed to
be regulatory in nature. Because of this distinction, it is appropriate to give some weight to the
nonpunitive reasons for the civil statute. Nonetheless, the standard applied should not result in the

ending of the analysis upon the finding of any legitimate, nonpunitive rationale to support the validity
of the law in question.
' The problem of dealing with retroactive laws that impair the obligations of contract is dealt
with in Hochman, supra note 76, at 694.
25 See supra notes 6-8, 24-32 and accompanying text.
22 See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
2' This is most true if the Court chooses to adopt a narrow reading of Kennedy v. MendozaMartine, "372 U.S. 144 (1962). See supra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.
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constitutionality on the law's proponents,
in light of the modem
complex regulatory schemes that are necessary for efficient functioning
of the federal government, it may be appropriate to shift this burden to
the challenger of a civil law, as the modem courts have done.
Nonetheless, that burden should not be virtually impossible for a litigant
to bear."5
The case law squarely places the burden of showing the punitive
intent behind a civil law on the law's challenger and defines that burden
as the production of unmistakable evidence.' These cases, however,
reflect both bad policy and an incorrect interpretation of the Constitution.
A better rule would be to ban retroactive civil laws in addition to
retroactive criminal laws-even those civil laws with a valid regulatory
purpose-when those laws are poisoned by punitive intent. This would
have the desired effect of placing the burden on the law's challenger to
establish a prima facie showing that the statute is punitive in design.
Once this punitive intent is demonstrated, the burden should shift to the
law's proponent, who would face a two-pronged analysis. First, the law's
proponent would have to illustrate a legitimate government purpose for
the civil law. Next, the law's proponent would be required to negate the
evidence of punitive intent.
An analysis of those cases that have identified punitive intent or the
lack of punitive intent in ex post facto challenges to civil laws reveals a
fairly complex set of factors developed to determine if a law is punitive.
The legislative history is an important source for determining if the civil
statute is punitive, as the legislative history of the statute may reveal an
intent to punish. The punitive intent can be overtly stated or demonstrated
by showing a "hidden intent." Hidden intent focuses on what the statute's
drafters intended to be the effect of the statute. Therefore, if the effect is
to punish, then a hidden intent to punish may be found. 7 For instance,
a punitive intent may be "hidden" by a carefully crafted statute that is
directed toward a particular individual or a particular class of individuals.
Similarly, a hidden intent may be revealed when the persons covered by
the statute are readily ascertainable so that the specific individuals harmed
could have been known to the legislature when the bill was passed.'

It is the opinion of the author that the drafters of the Constitution would place the burden on
the law's proponent to prove that the law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause in light of their
fear that such laws have the potential for tyranny. See supra notes 6-8, 27.28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114-27 and accompanying text.
Flnemning v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960).
'
For a discussion of "hidden intent" in the bill of attainder area, see Note, Punishment: Its
Meaning in Relation to Separation of Power and Substantive Cons

tiona Restrictions and Its Use

in the Lovett, Trop, Pere and Speiser Cases, 34 IND. L.L 251 (1958-59).
This concern dates back to the inclusion of the Ex Post Facto Clause in the Constitution as
a curb on legislative vindictiveness. See Madison, supra note 30, at 266.
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It is important to note that ex post facto analysis under the proposed
test should not end with the consideration of the law's legislative history.
It is necessary to determine if other indicia of punitiveness are present.
Such indicia include the following:
(1) The disability imposed by the statute is in the form of traditional
punishment or of excessive punishment; 9
(2) The statute identifies a fixed class of persons covered by the

statute coupled with the inability of the class members to opt out of the
class, the so-called "impossible condition" created by the statute. If the

group is a small number of persons, this would be stronger evidence of
an intent to punish
(3) The persons affected by the statute are morally blameworthy; the
act in question may involve moral turpitude of some kind,2
(4) The statute uses the deprivation as an instrument as opposed to

having the detriment be incidental to the regulation.21 This would
inject proportionality into the assessment of punitive design;
(5) The goal of the statute serves one or more of the traditional aims
of punishment: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation or incapacitation;
(6) The statute is a reflection of the political climate surrounding its
2 63
inception or appears to be the product of an inflamed legislature;
(7) There exist less burdensome alternatives that the legislature could

have adopted to meet its legitimate nonpunitive ends."
Once the law's opponent makes a prima facie showing of punitive

intent, the law's proponent must show that any disadvantage posed by the
retrospectivity of the statute is merely an unintended incident to the
regulation. The ills that the law-making body wishes to remedy should be

described and the regulation must be shown to flow from an intent to
deal with those ills. To survive the ex post facto challenge, the effect of
the statute should be consistent with the nonpunitive rationales offered by
the law's proponent. 5
"' See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1957) ("Fines, imprisonment and even execution may
be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these
traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect."); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144 (1962) (focusing upon the attempted deportation of United States citizens as a punitive use of
Congress's regulatory power).
"' See
e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
.. Henry M. Hart argues that the key characteristic of conduct that constitutes a crime is that it
is deserving of moral condemnation. For an interesting discussion of the limits of what should
constitute criminal conduct see Hart, supra note 18, at 402-06.
...
This idea is developed in George H. Dession, S&
, Law and Public Order, I VAND. L.
REv. 8, 14-15 (1947).
'
See, eg., Flemming, 363 U.S. at 615 (discussing the significance of historic circumstances in
determining punitive intent).
" Se, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv.,
433 U.S. at 425.
' For example, when the statute includes a disadvantageous effect that appears punitive in
nature, the law's proponent should be able to articulate reasons why the statute must be applied
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In the case of statutes involving mixed motives, the mandate of the
Ex Post Facto Clause requires the courts to abandon the general
presumption of legitimate regulatory purpose. The law should be
considered "essentially criminal" in nature, thus invoking the test
employed when considering retroactive criminal' laws. Under this
proposed analysis, if the law, when retroactively applied, disadvantages

the offender affected, it should be found to violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause.
VIII. THE TEST APPLIED:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY LAW
The social security cases provide a useful example of the problem of
mixed motives. These cases focus on incarcerated felons-people who are
being punished for crimes wholly unrelated to social security-yet they
involve a benefit that apparently serves no purpose when punishment is
being administered. From one perspective, the law restricting the payment
of benefits to felons serves the nonpunitive goal of conserving
resources.2 " From another, however, the law serves to penalize those
who have been convicted of felonies.267 There is no way to tease these
two strands of purpose apart and conclude that one dominates the
other.2" The evidence seems to establish that both purposes underlie the
law.269 In these situations the substantive rle articulated above should
be applied. 270 Applying this test to the social security law suspending
benefits 1to felons would change the result that troubled the D.C.
27
Circuit.
First, the court should determine if the statute is punitive in nature.
The legislative history of this statute is at best equivocal, including both
punitive and nonpunitive reasons for its passage.2 2 Since there is some

retroactively to effect the regulatory scheme. Furthermore, the law's proponent should be able to
prove that the operation of the portion of the act that is challenged does not, in effect, disrupt the
smooth operation of the regulatory plan as such a showing would clearly demonstrate a lack of
legitimate basis. Merely speculating about a possible nonpunitive rationale should not be sufficient
to offset the overt or hidden punitive intent.
'"See supra notes 214, 218 and accompanying text.
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
Cf. CHARLEs D. BROAD, CONSCIENCEmAND CONSCIENTIOUS AcrIoN, ETHics AND THE
HIsroRY oF PHILosopHY 244-62 (1952) (discussing how it is impossible to determine how a person
would have acted if one of the motives of an act had been absent).
An argument could certainly be made that even though both purposes underlie the law, the
punitive concern is a but-for cause.
' See supra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
"'See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 234-42 and accompanying text.
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indication that the law may be punitive, it is appropriate to look at other
factors that may confirm its penal character.
It is important to note that this law does not involve traditional
punishment because the law does not call for the extension of a felon's
sentence. Nevertheless, it may be characterized as a fine or monetary
penalty that is associated with an inmate's status as a felon. Those
benefits, earned by the person during his or her working life, are not paid
during the period of incarceration. 73 While it may be argued that the
statute in question is not punitive because it only affects benefits while
incarcerated, the argument is weakened by the fact that there is always an
absolute loss in income. Furthermore, this lost amount may be substantial
if the inmate faces a long sentence or life imprisonment.
The statute does identify a fixed class of persons-felons-who cannot
opt out of the class. If they are incarcerated felons, the loss established
in the law must be applied to them. Proponents of the law may argue that
the class is not fixed,2 4 as the law does allow for benefits to be
reinstated for those persons who are actively participating in a courtapproved rehabilitation program."
In reality, the fact that some
incarcerated felons can receive benefits while being housed and fed at
state expense actually undercuts the law's proponents' purported
nonpunitive objective of not having to pay twice for persons who are
incarcerated. Furthermore, by creating an incentive for rehabilitation, the
statute promotes a traditional goal of punishment.
In addition to the evidence of punitive intent found in the legislative
history, the fact that the group identified by the statute is a "morally
blameworthy" group raises some suspicion that the intent of the statute
is punitive. First, the statute specifically identifies felons rather than
misdemeanants!" While it could be argued that this distinction rests
upon the probability that felons will be incarcerated longer at state
expense than a misdemeanant, Congress could have constructed a statute

' Note, however, that these benefits could be reinstated if the inmate entered into a courtapproved rehabilitation program. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(x) (1988).
See Note, supra note 257, at 239-43.

42 U.S.C. § 402(x) states:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, no monthly benefits shall be
paid under this section or under section 423 of this title to any individual for any month
during which such individual is confined in a jail, prison, or other penal institution or

correctional facility, pursuant to his conviction of an offense which constituted a felony
under applicable law, unless such individual is actively and satisfactorily participating in
a rehabilitation program which has been specifically approved for such individual by a
court of law and, as determined by the Secrtary, is expected to result in such individual
being able to engage in substantial gainful activity upon release and within a reasonable

time.
Id.

" Id.
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that suspended the benefits of all persons who are sentenced to a year or
more, thereby demonstrating the nonpunitive concern in the drafting of
the statute. Instead, by identifying felons as the class to be affected, the
law focuses on the act rather than the ength of incarceration. This allows
for an anomalous result. For example, a felon who receives a four-month
sentence would have his benefits suspended while the misdemeanant
sentenced to nine months would continue to receive social security
benefits!' 7
It is unclear whether the deprivation of benefits included in the statute
is something that is "incidental" to the regulation. The nonpunitive goal
of stopping the double payment of benefits to incarcerated felons
certainly requires the suspension of the benefits. In that sense, the
deprivation is incidental. However, by providing a rehabilitation-program
incentive to have the benefits reinstated, the "incidental" effects of the
law become more "instrumental." This indicates that the law may be
designed to punish the behavior of the recipient and therefore may run
afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
The political climate surrounding the introduction of this statute also
points to its punitive origins. Congressional concern over the payments
of social security benefits to prisoners was generated by newspaper
articles in 1979 that claimed the celebrated "Son of Sam" killer was
receiving benefits 8 The general public outcry about the fact that
criminals were allowed to receive benefits is well documented in the
legislative history!" Under the proposed ex post facto analysis, the fact
that the law was conceived under "inflamed" circumstances indicates its
punitive quality and detracts from the validity of the asserted legitimate
purpose.
As a final comment, the statute as enacted is grossly underinclusive.
To reach the nonpunitive goal articulated in the statute, there are better
nonpunitive alternatives than the one drafted. For example, if the goal of
the statute is to stop paying benefits to those persons who are already

SlThe argument that the law manifests an intent to affect persons who are morally blameworthy
is furthered by the fact that the Social Security Administration continues to pay social security
benefits to persons who are housed and fed at state expense in state hospitals such as public nursing
homes and mental institutions. These persons do not carry the moral taint of a felony conviction, but
they do fall within the nonpunitive concern of Congress that taxpayers not be forced to pay double
for social security recipients. In fact, it is possible that the cost saving that would be realized if
persons housed in state hospitals were taken off the social security rolls would be substantially greater
than the saving that occurs with the termination of felons. For a discussion of the cost of savings
projected for removing felons from the list of those receiving social security, see CRS RPoRT, supra
note 201. When this law was passed, Senator Grassley, the sponsor of the Senate amendment,
candidly stated that "[t]he
basic goal in adopting such a law is not to generate revenues." 129 CoNG.
REC. S3627 (daily ed. Mar. 22. 1983) (statement of Senator Grassley).
See generally CRS RPoRT, supra note 201, at 2.

a"See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
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supported by the state, the statute should be extended to all persons that
fall within that category, including inmates in prisons, public mental
institutions and VA hospitals. If there are administrative problems with
suspending benefits to those persons who are incarcerated or held in an
institution only for a short period of time, then the statute could be
written so that it applies only if the person will be housed in an
institution for more than a specified period of time.
Similarly, if the nonpunitive purpose is to prevent the strong-arming
of inmates in prisons for their money, then a law requiring that all social
security benefits going to prisoners be placed immediately in the inmate's
prison account would meet this goal. The presence of such narrowly
drawn alternatives to the law that better meet the nonpunitive goals of the
statute serve as additional evidence that the statute was intended to be
punitive.
Given this substantial evidence of punitive intent the test articulated
in Miller v. Florida280 should be used to determine if the Social Security law offends the Ex Post Facto Clause. First, it is necessary to
determine if the law is being applied retroactively. In this case, for the
suspension to come into being, the person must be a felon. If any inmates
disadvantaged by the measure attained this classification as felon prior to
the law's enactment the suspension of benefits is being applied to them
retroactively. Obviously, it must be determined if the statute in fact
disadvantages the offender affected by it. Here, clearly the loss of several
hundred dollars per month works to the inmate's disadvantage. Therefore,
as applied retroactively, the statute offends the Ex Post Facto Clause and
should not be applicable to any claimant whose felony conviction
preceded the enactment of the statute. As for those persons who are
incarcerated for felonies committed since the enactment of the statute, the
law is not a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
CONCLUSION

At the time of the framing of the United States Constitution, the
drafters voiced deep concern about the evils of retroactive laws. The
debates focused on. all retrospective laws and made no distinction
between civil and criminal statutes. The framers thus recognized the need
for people to have notice of what laws would apply to them. Armed with
such notice, citizens could act with reasonable certainty about the legal
consequences of their acts and have some stability with respect to past
transactions. The Constitution included the Ex Post Facto Clause to
protect these values. Since the ratification of the Constitution, the need

no 482 U.S. 423 (1987); see discussion supra notes 174-98 and acconpanying text.
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for notice and stability has not changed, nor has the potential for
vindictive acts on the part of Congress. Yet the score of ex post facto
protection has been narrowed by judicial action.
The Court has interpreted the ex post facto prohibition in such a way
that retroactive criminal laws achieve the degree of protection envisioned
by the framers. Retroactive civil laws, on the other hand, receive very
little scrutiny by the courts. Any disadvantage imposed by a civil law is
presumed to be incidental to a legitimate regulatory purpose. That
presumption is so strong that in the face of mixed motives-a legitimate
motive and a punitive design-the presumption of legitimacy holds." t
The courts have virtually created a means for the legislature to
penalize through the use of civil statutes. By clothing a statute in civil
dress it is rendered essentially immune from ex post facto scrutiny.
Today, most who fall within the ambit of an ex post facto civil statute
may tend to be those who are considered morally blameworthy and
therefore worthy of legislative vindictiveness. But under the Constitution,
if such a law can be passed to cover morally blameworthy individuals, it
can also be passed to cover any citizen. This is the foundation of tyranny.
The framers could not have anticipated the development of complex
regulatory schemes that would make a ban on all retrospective civil laws
inappropriate. Nevertheless, when retroactive civil legislation is punitive,
even if coupled with a legitimate regulatory purpose, the degree of
concern that fuels the scrutiny of criminal law should also fuel scrutiny
of civil law. The evils that motivated the framers are clearly present.
Legislatures should be forced to rewrite civil legislation that runs afoul
of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Such protection may cool the legislative
passion to punish through civil statutes. This type of dialogue between the
legislature and the judiciary could provide meaningful protection against
ex post facto laws while permitting reasonably necessary retroactive
regulation.

' See supm notes 201-42 and accomipanying text.

